Investment status of railroad securities by Fitzgerald, Gilbert Iveson
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1938
Investment status of railroad
securities
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/13808
Boston University

LIBRARY
BOS TON
UNIVERS I TY
^COLLy^GE^
.JJiBUSj/n ess <r[L=
ADMINIS TRATION
Class No. 3 J-i.C
Book No.
Acc. No. ^(t i /C
Date - ^0 'Jf
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
College of Business Administration
THESIS
INVESTI^NT STATUS OF RAILROAD SECURITIES
GILBERT IVESON FITZGERALD
(B.S. in B.A. Boston University 1936)
submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
1938

INDEX
Part 1. Industry Analysis
Page
Importance of Railroad Securities 1
Railroad Growth 2
Economic Position Declining .... 6
Divergent Trends 9
Railroad Freight Traffic 10
Railroad Passengar Traffic 12
Railroad Freight Rates , 16
Labor Problems 18
Financial Problems 21
Reorganizations • . . 23
Temporary Favorable Factors 25
Railroad Operating Efficiency 27
Abandonments 28
Railroad Earning Pov/er Not Responding
To Improved Business 50
Conclusions , 32
Future Of American Railroads 35
Investment Status 35
Part 2, Company Analysis
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry 39
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings, Near Term Outlook, Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status,
Atlantic Coast Line kj
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization. Traffic
Earnings, Near Term Outlook. Longer Terra Out-
look, Investment Status.
Baltimore & Ohio 56
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization. Traffic
Earnings. Near Term Outlook, Longer Term Out-
look, Investment Status,

Bangor & Aroostook Railroad
Mileage. Importance. Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings, Near Term Outlook, Longer Term Out-
look, Investment Status,
Canadian Pacific Railway Co
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings. Near Term Outlook. Longer Term Out-
look, Investment Status.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co
Miiearre, Importance. Capitalization, Traffic.
Earnings, Near Term Outlook. Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
Delaware & Hudson Company
Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. Mileage,
Importance. Capitalization. Traffic, Earnings,
Near Terra Outlook, Longer Terra Outlook, Invest-
ment Status.
Illinois Central Railroad Co
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization, Traffic.
Earnings. Near Term Outlook. Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co
Mileage, Importance, Capitalization, Traffic.
Earnings, Near Term Outlook. Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
New York Central Railroad Co
Mileage. Importance, Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings. Near Term Outlook, Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co. ...
Mileage, Importance. Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings. Near Term Outlook, Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co
Mileage. Importance. Capitalization. Traffic.
Earnings. Near Term Outlook. Longer Term Out-
look. Investment Status.
Conclusions ,
Bibliography
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015
https://archive.org/details/investmentstatusOOfitz
PART I
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS

IMPORTMICE OF RAILEOAD SECURITIES
With little more than six per cent of the world's area
and less than seven per cent of its population, the United
States has more than thirty-three per cent of the world's
railway mileage and far more than one half of the aggregate
railway capacity, Reckoned together the railways of the
United States represent the largest single "vested interest"
in the world. In 1935 the railroad securities held by the
public amounted to the staggering total of $18,3^2,297,^29,
divided into 17,001,705,892 in capital stock and |ll,3^0,-
591,537 in funded debt. On these securities approximately
#663,555,159 are paid annually in interest and dividends,
i'he securities are widely held and have constituted one of
the most attractive fields for investment. For years rail-
road bonds and even stocks were regarded as prime securities,
m fact, at times they were considered as constituting for
all practical purposes the only investments worthy of con-
sideration.
Together with the direct owners of railroad securities
the vast majority of American people have an indirect fi-
nancial interest in the railroads, for a sizeable part of
the investments of our insurance companies and savings banks
are in railroad bonds. In fact, railroad bonds were the
leading division, approximating forty-five per cent of the
1

2#5,853,167,000 corporate bonds held by leading life insurance
companies on December 31, 1936, or aoout thirteen per cent of
their total assets. Any financial disaster, tnerefore, to
the railroads would affect praci-ically everyone in an invest-
ment way. This widespread economic interest is an important
reason for the unusual financial aid extended to the railroads
in their extreme distress during the last depression and even
to tnis very date. One reason why so many conservative funds
are stiil invested in railroad securities is that it nas been
very difficult for large institutions, banks and insurance
companies, to shift tneir investments out of this field,
either because substitutes adequate in amount were unavail-
able, or because of the necessity of satisfying legal re-
quirements
.
RAILROAD GROWTH
The superiority of railroads in inland transportation
was definitely estabiisned by I850. At that time much of the
public domain, which had been recently augmented by the
annexation of Texas and the region including the present
state of California, was totally unsalable and in order to
attract settlers and induce sales transportation was nec-
essary. It was a natural expedient then for the Government
to devote a fraction of the then valueless lands to render
the remainder a profitable asset, ihis was achieved by the
land-grant policy which began in I850. The total area grant-

3ed to the railroads was approximately 215,000,000 acres.
A great railroad building boom resulted largely as a
consequence of the land-grant policy and ended in the con-
struction of an excessive amount of mileage operated by a
number of competing companies. A good many of the rail-
roads were built on the theory that they would develop the
country through which they were to run and thus justify their
construction at a later date. Their building in many cases
was undertaken purely from a speculative standpoint. As
was to be expected this over-stimulation led to excessive
competition for traffic during times when the aggregate demand
for transportation was insufficient to afford a fair return
upon railway investments. The competition resulting from this
wild construction finally became so intense that many abuses
developed. As a result many railroad failures occurred and
there ensued a period of mergers which gave to many railroad
systems such added strength that some of them began to dis-
regard the interests of the public. The abuses became so
acute that it finally became necessary in 1887 for the United
States Government to regulate the railroads in the interest
of the public. As has always been the case, this Federal
regulation at its inception was mild but became increasingly
more severe until today the Government, through its agencies
exercises virtually complete control over our railroad system.
The rapid growth of the railroads paralleled the country

4in both population and production for a good many years. But
expansion cannot last forever and the year 1920 marks the
close of a ninety-year cycle of expansion and prosperity for
the railroad industry. That this year marks the approximate
peak of railroad growth can be best shown by the following
table.
Revenue
Year Population
Railway-
Mileage
Rail Oper,
Revenues
(millions)
Per Ton
Miles
(millions)
1900 76,129,408 193,346 1,487 7.84
1905 84,219,378 216,820 2,082 8.22
1910 92,267,080 240,293 2,812 7.99
1915 99,342,625 253,789 2,956 7.89
1920 106,421,621 252,845 6,311 11.35
1925 115,378,094 249,398 6,123 10.92
1930 122,775,046 249,052 5,281 10.55
1935 127,521,000 241,822 3,452 9.43
Prior to 1920 railroads had progressed despite all
obstacles, overcoming the destructive effects of uncontrolled
expansion, stock market manipulations, floods, wars, droughts,
mounting taxes, restrictive legislation and new forms of com-
petition. But during that time the railroad industry was
generating the factors and breeding the weaknesses which are

responsible for its present plight. As early as 1916 the
relative popularity of railroad stocks, as measured by the
Dow Jones averages for rails and industrials, was more or
less waning.

6ECONOMIC POSITION DECLINING
A study of the following table reveals the railroads
retrogression since 1920,
RAILROAD TRAFFIC FACTORS
Percentage Chanp:e
Miscellaneous Statistics 1922-29 1929-35
u# D, Jropuxauion 4. T
mcLUBbnax proauciiion 1+ x^
Steel production 4- 57 14
Automobile production 103 18
Passenger car registrations + 113 + 5
Truck registrations -1- 146 + 19
Revenue bus passengers carried 26 + 85
Airplane passengers carried ,660 538
Airplane express carried ,140 4-2 ,690
Railroad Statistics
Total operating revenues + 13 35
Total operating expenses 4 2 35
Net railway operating income 63 36
Revenue freight per ton miles + 32 24
Passenger miles 12 28
*19 26 -29
Source: Computed by Poor's (Railroad data from ICC reports)
I
7The table on page 6 is of sufficient importance a.nd sig-
nificance to warrant considerable attention. During the great-
est of all American boom periods, that from 1922-29, industrial
production increased 4o percent, steel production 57 per cent
and railroad traffic - revenue freight ton miles - increased
only 32 per cent and passenger miles actually decreased 12 per
cent. This decline in passenger-miles can easily be explain-
ed by again referring to the table. Automobile production
during the great boom increased 103 per cent, truck registra-
tions 146 per cent; although travel was greatly stimulated
during this period, other transportation agencies, rather
than the railroads, were utilized as is evidenced by the
2,660 per cent increase in airplane passengers carried and
the 26 per cent increase in revenue bus passengers carried "
during the period 1926 to 1929.
In the seven year period following 1929 industrial
production showed a decrease of 12 per cent and steel pro-
duction a decrease of 14 per cent. However, total operating
revenues of railroads declined 35 per cent during the same
period and revenue freight ton miles declined 24 per cent
and passenger miles declined 28 per cent. While during tne
same period passenger car registrations, truck registrations,
revenue bus passengers carried and airplane passengers carried,
all showed substantial percentage increases.
The only conclusions to draw are that railroads did not
share in the prosperous era during 1922-29 to the same extent
J
8as did general industry, nor have the railroads shown any-
real tendency to recover from the depression lows in pro-
portion to the improvement shown "by industry Lhroughout
the country.

9DIVERGENT TRENDS
In addition to the tremendous growth of competition
since 1920, a great variety of trends in industry and com-
merce beyond the control of the railroads have tended to
deprive the railroads of the traffic which was formerly
theirs. Taken as a whole these divergent trends have ser-
iously affected railroad revenue tonnage. The single trend
in industry of particular detriment to the railroads was the
tendency of many industries to locate in closer proximity
to raw materials and markets. This relocation of industry
materially reduced freight bills; and the more efficient
use of industrial fuels and raw materials has had a similar
effect. In like manner, the loss of export markets for
American agricultural products, especially cotton and wheat
has been a severe blow} The oil and gasoline pipe lines
have permanently taken away a great deal of the traffic
which the railroads would otherwise have enjoyed. Another
situation of singular moment and discouraging implication is
the decreasing importance of anthracite as a fuel. The demand
for anthracite has been rapidly declining during the past
decade. The industry has lost markets because bitter strikes
have tied up production in winter months, and because com-
petitive fuels, principally gas and oil, have made determined
bids for the limited house-heating market which the anthra-
Poor's Industry & Investment Survey - Railroads - page 4.
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cite producers once regarded as their own private domain.
The decline in anthracite traffic is of serious consequence,
for Class 1 roads receive approximately §103,000,000 in rev-
enues from this traffic.
Railroad Freight Traffic
Freight traffic has always been the mainstay of the in-
come of the American railroads talcen as a whole. JMotwith-
standing the inroads made by competitors, it is to be noted
that the railroads still command about 70 per cent of the
country's freight traffic. The importance of tnis traffic
to the railroads can best be understood by a study of the
following table,
BREAK-DOWN OF RAILWAY OPERATING
REVENUES, 1936
(class 1 railroads)
Revenue ^ of Total
( thous^ Oper. Rev.
Total Operating Revenues |^j,052,734 100,00
Freight 3,^04,917 84,02
Passenger 411,842 10.16
Express 60,187 1.48
Mail 95,575 2.36
All Other 80,203 1.98
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission,
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As can readily be seen by the table on the preceding
page, freight revenues are the life blood of the railroads;
and revenues from passenger traffic are of comparatively
slight importance.
In order to exist the railroads must preserve their
freight traffic, it appears on the surface that the rail-
road managements did not recognize in the motor truck a
serious competitor, and for years they did nothing to protect
themselves against the inroads made by trucks. It is inter-
esting to compare the record of the tonnage of freight carried
by the railroads and the income they derive therefrom with
the statistics of the competitors of the railroads, it is
only too evident that the railroads have lagged behind.
Realising that something must be done to hold its
remaining freight traffic the railroads have established
a motor truck service in store-door pick-up and delivery
of freight which has proved successful in regaining some
lost traffic, nowever, the new service is very expensive
and in some instances the cost actually exceeds the result-
ant freight revenue. More important is the railroad's
supplementary expansion into highway trucking. While this
move may be considered an admission of declining railroad
fortunes, it, nevertheless, is a constructive step.
There is no chance that motor trucks can take away
from the railroads their heavier traffic, for instance coal.
Coal is of primary importance to a majority of railroads
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and ordinarily constitutes 50 per cent of all railroad ton-
nage. The railroads will continue to carry practically all
the stone, ore, gravel, cement, heavy steel, and other such
items which they are equipped to handle far more efficiently
than motor trucks, however, heavy industry materials rep-
resent the least profitable types of traffic and for that
reason generally rate as a supplementary rather than a
primary source of earnings,
RAILROAD PASSEr-iGER TRAFFIC
From an operating standpoint, Class 1 railroads se-
cured profits from their freight traffic throughout the
depression Abased on statistics compiled by the I.CG,).
however, income from passenger traffic has declined stead-
ily since 1929 and in 1930 the first year of the depression
the passenger divisions of the railroads were operating at
a deficit end by 1935 made a record deficit of •^161,407,000.
This may be ascribed principally to keen competition from
the privately owned automobile which according to Coordinator
Eastman, carried approximately 85 per cent of the nation's
passengers in 193^ and accounted for 90 per cent of the
transportation dollar. It is apparent that there is little
that the rails can do to meet the automobile's superior
flexibility.
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A glance at the following table clearly shows the
tremendous inroads that the automobile has made in command-
ing the movement of passengers.
PASSENGSR TFJIFFIC 193-^
Number of Passenp;ers
(thous.) % of total
Airplane 461
Inter-City Bus 378,200 6.7
Railroad 450,000 8..
3
private Auto 4,600,000 85.0
Source: Compiled from data supplied by Joseph B,
Eastman and ICC reports.
It is very evident that the automobile has practically
a complete monopoly on the passenger traffic in the United
States. That the automobile has seriously impaired the
railroads income from passenger traffic can best be illus-
trated by referring to the table printed below.
PASSSNGSR REVENUES
(000 omitted)
1925 - 1,426,940
1926 - 1,419,990
1927 - 1,345,580
1928 - 1,275,500
1929 - 1,300,110
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PASSENGER REVSl^JUES
(000 omitted)
continued
1930 - 1,066,880
1931 - 828,590
1932 - 594, 8A0
1933 - 519,750
1934 546,470
1935 - 557,560
1936 - 627,690
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission reports.
Railroad management has been extremely negligent in
meeting the competition of automobiles and has fought fare
reductions almost without exception. The Southern railroads,
were first to try lower ps.ssenger rates in an endeavor to
cope with the problem of declining passenger traffic, and
considerable success was achieved. However, the Eastern
roads were slow to realize the benefits attached to lower
fares and larger volume and it was not until forced by the
ICC, in June 1936 that they followed the lead of the Southern
roads and made fare reductions, which in a good many instances
have proved satisfactory.
During the past few years great progress has been made
in improving passenger service. The new streamline trains
have caught the public fancy and although these trains can
do little more than absorb regular passenger traffic on long
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hauls over main lines, they represent a real advance in
comfort and economy which may again direct attention to
rail transportation. In order to meet competition from the
private automobile, coaches have been air-conditioned and,
in the more popular trains, meals are served at no more
than roadside costs, while the passenger may bring along his
car for the price of one more ticket. In spite of the recent
innovations in passenger travel the agf.regate of passenger
business is still handled at a loss, nowever, there is
evidence that progressive management policies will eventually
bear fruit.
The railroads have realized that improvement of pass-
enger trains is not enough to regain any substantial portion
of their former passenger traffic and they have invested con-
siderable money in passenger buses, thus facilitating the
abandonment of unprofitable branch line mileaf^e which in
many cases is proving beneficial.
Although some improvement may be experienced and a portion
of lost passenger traffic may be regained, the suporior
flexibility and convenience of the private car has perms"
nently deprived the railroads of by far the larger portion of
their former customers; and lower rates, streamlining, air-
condidioning and de luxe cars cannot hope to win them back.
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RAILROAD FREIGhT RATES
One of the fundamental factors in our national economy
is the structure of railroad freight rates. These rates are
responsible to a large extent for the development of agri-
cultural areas, the exploitation of mineral deposits, the
location of industries and the expansion of markets. Incred-
ible though it may seem, no individual railroad rate is
based on the vital factor of cost, railroads are obliged to
carry coal, ore, grains and other ra\7 materials at low rates,
to make possible the marketing of merchandise and manufactured
goods of higher value.*
This practice of charging rates having no direct relation
to costs, rests upon the theory that railroads constitute a
transportation monopoly, which any investigation can prove
to be untrue. The result is that even a small amount of com-
petition, taking as it has, the most profitable traffic,
upsets the whole earnings structure of railroads. The problem
is one of tremendous magnitude and seems to defy solution;
for a revision in rate structure in line with costs would
lead to a disruption in general industry.
As a result of competitors capturing a large portion
of the railroads most profitable freight, it is natural that
*Bogen's "Analysis Of Railroad Securities" Page 58.
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the railroads should have become increasingly dependent
upon heavy industry traffic in which they enjoy competitive
advantages, Kealizing that the rate structure of railroads
does not provide a suitable income the iCC has increased
rates on a number of the heavy industry materials carried
chiefly by railroads. This increased rate is a step in the
right direction and may prove of considerable help, but
hardly likely to prove a permanent cure. ^For a discussion
of iCC rate increases refer to ''Temporary Favorable Factors"
page 26)
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LABOR PROBLEMS
A brief study of the following table reveals the vital
importance of labor costs to the railroad industry. In recent
years salaries have averaged 45 per cent of gross revenue or
more than 60 per cent of total operating expenses,
THE RAILROAD DOLLAR
(expressed in cents per dollar of gross revenue)
i-y xy
Total operating revenues 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0
Salaries & wages* 43.2 44.1 45.0 42.9
Fuel (locomotive} 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.9
Mat. supplies & misc. 15.4 15.9 16.2 16,4
Injuries , ins
. ,
pensions 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.3
Depreciation & retire. 6.5 5.9 5.7 4.8
Taxes 8.1 7.3 6.9 7.9
Hire of equip. & joint
facility net rental 5,5
Total expenses & taxes 84.7 85.9 85.5 83.5
Net Railway Oper. Income 15.3 14.1 14,5 16.5
*Does not include payroll chargeable to capital account.
Source: Association of American Railroads.
Few industries are so thoroughly unionized or have been
subject to collective employee bargaining as the railroads.
Fortunately labor relations are generally favorable. .Man-
agement and labor have been able to arbitrate their differ-
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ences and for the last twenty-one years no widespread st-rike
has threatened.
During recent years, however, there has been a good deal
of labor bickering. Congress passed a Railroad Retirement
Act which was declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court only to be followed by similar substitute legis-
lation in separate tax and pension acts which, in turn, is
being contested in the Courts. Early in 1937» a new bill
was introduced into Congress, the result of railroad.- labor
and management agreement. The bill requires a 2^- per cent of
payroll contribution by corporation and worker alike, the
rate gradually increasing to per cent by 19^9. This leg-
islation, if passed, would not offset the increased costs
for unemployment insurance under the Social Security Act or
similar state legislation, and therefore, may be considered
an additional burden which musi, oe shouldered by the rail-
roads ,
In 1932, railroad labor accepted a 20 percent wage cut
which was reLumed piecemeal, the Ic.st of ohe decrease was
restored in April 1935. In March, 1937, rail labor demanded
a twenty per cent wage advance. It is estimated that this
would increase railroad operating costs by #400,000,000.
However, following arbitration, non-operating employees
received, effective August 1, 1937, a 5 cents per hour raise
while the operating employees received, effective October 1,
1937, a 5^ cents per hour raise. This settlement approx-
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imated 8,8 per cent and 6.6 per cent respectively.* At the
present time a powerful railroad lobby Is backing such unfa-
vorable legislation as the six hour day without reduction in
daily wages, limitation of train length and full crews
whether or not necessary. While it is almost certain that
this legislation will not be passed it, nevertheless serves
as an lllustraLion of the desires of the powerful railroad
labor unions. With the power of organized labor greatly on
the Increase in America it is very likely that a large portion
of labor's demands will be favorably recognized by the United
States Government. As was pointed out before, the percentage
of operating costs which are absorbed by labor is very high
and any Increase is liable to add an unbearable load to the
railroads already weakened financial position.
*Poor*s Industry & Investment Survey - Railroads - Page 6
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FINANCIAL PROBLEIilS
There is no denying that railroad capitalization is ex-
cessive. The total capitalization of Class 1 roads amounts
to $19, 7-^0, 000, 000 and is divided into 58.4 per cent debt,
9,4 per cent preferred and 32 per cent common stock. At
first glance this capitalization may not appear excessive
in relation to the #26,000,000,000 Invested in road, equip-
ment and other fixed assets. The real criterion, however,
is earning power which does not support this capitalization.
In 1936 more than 38 per cent of the railroad mileage in the
United States operated at a deficit and the return on in-
vested assets in the same year was only 2,58 per cent com-
pared with 1,25 per cent at the low of the depression in
1932 and an eight year average of 2.44 per cent. Even in
the boom year 1929 the return was only 4,84 per cent,*
Although the major portion of the total railroad mileage
constructed has been financed through the sale of fixed
obligations, adequate provision was never made by the rail-
roads for obsolescence of their property and investments,
or for amortization of debt prior to its maturity. The be-
lief that railroads would indefinitely be able to refund
debt as it fell due was based upon the belief that the position
of the railroads, as the nation's transportation industry, was
* Interstate Commerce Commission reports.
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impregnable. The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1930
recognized the dangers of this financial policy and ordered
the railroads to set up depreciation against their fixed in-
vestments. This order was withdrawn when the depression be-
came acute. Jriowever, it is now being enforced where earnings
are of sufficient size to stand the charge. It is significant
to note that the ICC has come to realize that the position of
the railroads is not too secure and it is now assuming a more
concilliatory attitude in regards to rate increases.
The current financial position of the railroads is most
disconcerting. As a result of restricted earning power and
complete stagnation of public financing during the depression,
refunding of maturing debt was impossible for many roads.
Thus temporary financing measures were of necessity resorted
to; and the railroads borrov/ed heavily from the Reconstruction
Finance Corp., the Public Works Administration, the banks and
,
their self-created Railroad Credit Corp. In this manner many
companies escaped receivership during the period of acute
financial distress, but added heavily to their short term debt.
The total RFC loans over- hanging the railroads as of November
1, 1937 amounted to $356,000,000, not to mention ip259 , 365, 000
funded debt due in 1938 and |3 10, 000, 000 in 1939. Although
the credit standing of the railroads has improved during the
past year, improvement has not been commensurate with the
gains made by general business, nor sufficient to enable a
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large numbsr of railroads to stand by themselves. Unless
some aid is forth-coming a number of the border line rail-
roads will be unable to meet their near-terra obligations.
Realizing this fact the Government has decided to continue
RFC loans and to extend the maturing loans if necessary.
This help is essential to the railroads to avoid bankruptcy
but it in no way improves their long-terra financial position,
in fact, it adds another burden to the roads' already in-
suportable capitalization and while it postpones the day of
reckoning, it makes it all the more inevitable.
REORGANIZATIONS
It is not realized by a good many investors that by the
close of 1936 railroad companies operating 22,3 per cent of
the natlond mileage had filed reorganization proceedings under
section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, while an additional
6,4 per cent were in receivership. This situation is cer-
tainly serious and is only an example of what will happen to
a large number of railroads in the event of another depres-
sion.
Reorganizations up to the present time have been very
discouraging. The laws governing the proceedings have not as
yet been declared constitutional nor is any test case likely
to be advanced in the near future. The new Bankruptcy Act,
even as amended has proved ineffective and all the glowing
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promises that it would speed up reorganizations and effect
them at tremendous savings were all unfounded, over optimis-
tic speculations. The trouble is largely due to the involved
reorganization r^rocedure which provides for additional hearing
even after the ICC has approved a plan. Furthermore, the plan
is again delayed when it reaches the courts.
A study of attempted reorganizations reveals that con-
siderable attention is being given to the common and preferred
stockholders and rather than completely wipe them out as v/as
formerly done they are now accorded a proportionate share in
the reorganized company. Im most instances fixed charges are
drastically cut. However, these reductions in fixed charges
are generally reflected in equal increases in contingent
charges, with the addition of sinking funds. This type of
reorganization will not prove satisfactory. Funded debt is
not being sufficiently reduced in line with values in the
reorganization plans now under consideration by the Courts.
If these proposed plans are eventually consummated the roads
will QO limping forth still burdened by uheir former top-
heavy and insuppoi table capitalizations. The plans fail to
rectify the chronic ailments which have forced the railroads
into difficulties; they do not reduce capitalization in line
with a true valuation of assets, nor in line v/ith earning
power.

TEMPORARY FAVURA3LE FACTORS
25
Of considerable benefit to the rails v/as the 2>iotor
Carriers Act of 1935 which placed motor trucks and buses
under federal regulation. The railroads had maintained for
a number of years that a good part of the truck and bus
traffic was carried at unremunerative rates and that this
produced unfair and uneconomic competition. Under the Act
the ICC is empo?/ered to cause publication of trucking rates
and adherence to them. At the sams time, trucking companies
must comply with more stringent insurance and labor provisions,
bringing costs more nearly in line with those of the railroads.
In the same category, a second favorable development has
been greater leniency on the part of the ICC in sanctioning
competitive rail rates despite the long and short haul clause
of the Interstate Commerce Act. This clause provides that
railway rates to any point may not be lov/er than those to a
less distant point on the same route. The practical effect
of the clause has been to prevent the carriers from bidding
on a strictly competitive rate basis for medium-long haul
traffic now going to the trucking companies. The railroads
hope that the rettengill Bill will eventually be passed amend-
ing the interstate Commerce Act on this point. They are also
campaigning for legislation which will subject water carriers
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to ICC regulation.
Another factor which considerably aided the rails was
the temporary freight rate surcharge authorized by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in March 1935. During 1936, the
surcharges which were placed principally upon coal, ore,
petroleum, iron, steel, automobiles etc., netted Class 1
railroads approximately §120,000,000 additional revenue
without any apparent loss of traffic. The ICC extended the
surcharge rates from dune 30, 1936 to the close of that
year, then allowed them to expire. Of course, the railroads
tried to incorporate the surcharges as permanent rates but
were unsuccessful, nowever, the ICC realized that the rail-
roads' plight was serious and in March 1937 approved increase-s
on miscellaneous commodities - estimated to yield sflO,000,000
annually - and in June granted Lerritorial increases upon
textile products. In October of the same year the iCC in a
sweeping decision again granted the railroads* request for
freight rate advances, while the increased rates, in them-
selves, will cover only a small portion of the higher oper-
ating expenses recently experienced by the roads, the iCC
has made clear that it is prepared to give consideration to
further rate adjustments in order to enable the railroads to
operate profitably. Actually, i-he increased revenues granted
by the ICC to the rails covers only a small portion of the
larger expenses which they face as a result of wage increases
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totaling ^130,000,000, and higher material and other expen-
ses which have been estimated to cost the roads between
.if300,-
000,000 and $600,000,000 a year.* That further increases
in freight rates will toe granted is almost a foregone con-
clusion.
It should toe recognized that the actual and proposed
rate increases represent merely an adjustment to changed
economic conditions and a v/ord of caution concerning too
toullish interpretation of them may toe necessary. It is
possible that higher rates, in certain instances, may impede
the movement of traffic with resultant lower, rather than
higher, gross from these sources. Also, the course of general
business, with the consequent fluctuations in the volume of traffic
will have its usual pronounced effects upon the earning power
and financial condition of the railroad industry.
Railroad Operating Efficiency
Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed toy an inflex-
itole plant and toy the financial handicaps made so acute toy
the depression, railroad physical operating efficiency, on
the whole, has improved during the last few years. Although
during the depression, as was to toe expected, railroad effi-
ciency declined; capital expenditures were drastically re-
duced, further improvements of all kinds were deferred and
*Estimated toy Poor's Putolishing Co,
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maintenance was neglected. However, on the basis of sev-
eral indexes - fuel consumption and the number of gross
ton miles per train hour - rail efficiency reached- new
heights in 1936. This may be attributed chiefly to tne adop-
tion of lighter weight cc.rs and more economic fuel consum-
ption as well as :.o the introduction of diesel power. Although
this improved efficiency is commendable it v/ill not do much
to increase the earnings of railroads.
ABANDONMENTS
The greatest opportunity for the railroads to effect
further economies lies in the abandonment of inefficient
equipment and unprofitable lines as well as in the elimin-
ation of duplication of personnel and services by effecting
mergers. The idea of economizing by the abandonment of in-
efficient equipment and unorofitable lines is all very good
but the debt issued to raise funds to buy the equipment and
build the lines will still be an ever present reminder of
unwise expansion and will continue as a burden on the remain-
ing miles of road. The advantages of coordination and mergers
are self-evident, Thousanci of miles of duplicating and com-
peting tracks could be abandoned and economies could be effect-
ed by reducing the number of employees. But without drastic
recapitalizations the fixed charges of the merged roads Y/ould
remain tne same, in fact, the burden per mile of road would
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be increased since t-ne funded debt of the duplicating mileage
must still be serviced. It is questionable whether merged
roads would be able to effect any savings as regards their
labor costs for labor unions and railway managements have
formed a five year agreement effective June lo, 1936, pro-
viding for compensation of employees deprived of employment
as a result of railway coordinations and mergers.
It is logical to believe that the salvation of the rail-
roads might be accomplished by wise mergers to be effected
only after a drastic revision of property valuations had
been made and a corresponding reduction in capitalization in
line with earnings. It is obvious, however, that many dif-
ficulties stand in the way of securing unity of action and
progress at best must be slow.
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RAILROAD EARNING POW sR NOT RESPONDING TO BIPROVED BUSINESS
It Is to be expected that with any Improvement in bus-
iness the railroads will enjoy more traffic than they did
during the depression. However, if it is kept in mind that
the physical volume of railroad traffic did not increase per-
ceptibly during the boom which culminated in 1929 and if it
is realized how rapidly competitors of the railroads are de-
veloping and how much faster their business is growing than
that of the railroads, it becomes apparent that the railroads
cannot look forward to a long-term trend of increasing traffic
This fact is ably developed by the following table.
THE RECOVERY IN RAILROAD TRAFFIC
AND REVEi^UE
(Five-Year Average: 1926-1930 equals 100)
Per Cent of 5 Year Average
19^2 1956
Revenue freight car loadings 55.2 70.7
Revenue ton-miles 5A.8 79.2
Revenue passenger-miles 53.4 70.5
Total operating revenues 51.8 67.2
Charges for maint. way & struct. 43.8 52.5
Total operating expenses 54.4 66.8
Operating expenses per ton-mile 97.8 82.2
Net railway operating income 29.3 59.9
Average revenue per ton-mile 97.3 90,6
Average rev. per passenger-mile 78.1 64.7
Source: Poor's Industry & Investment Survey "Railroads"
page 12,

31
(1) This table clearly reveals that the recovery in freight
traffic has failed to keep pace with the general recovery
movement. To some extent this may "be partially caused by the
fact that the revival in heavy industry from which the rail-
roads derive the major part of their tonnage, did not commence
until late in 1935. Notv/ithstanding this, the figures reflect
a relative decline in the use of railroad services owing to
diversion of traffic to competing agencies and owing to
basic economic changes that have acted to reduce the tonnage
of products transported. .
(2) That railroa,d passenger travel has shown almost a neg-
ligible recovery. This substantiates the other evidence that
automobiles, buses, airplanes, etc, have usurped the dominant
place once held by the railroads in the field of passenger
transportation,
(3) That total operating revenues have shown even smaller
comparative gains than revenue ton miles. This may be ex-
plained by the fact that the average charges per unit of
service have decreased as a result of competitive pressure
particularly with respect to passenger traffic, and the loss
of a large portion of short-haul, high-rate tonnage to trucks,
(4) That total operating expenses have not gained in pro-
portion to the total gains in dollar revenue. This reflects
curtailed maintenance expenditures. Generally speaking,
reduced maintenance work is, of necessity, but a postpone-
ment of expens a that must eventually be incurred to meet
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efficiently the demands for handling traffic.
(5) That, although net operating income has shown a substan-
tial recovery it is still farther below the pre -depress ion
level than any other item shown in the table with the excep-
tion of maintenance. It is well to remember that the showing
of net income has been considerably helped by the inadequate
maintenance charges as well as the similarly small increase
in total operating expenses.
CONCLUSIONS
The railroad industry, both as regar* actual physical
VDlume of traffic and as regards income received, no longer
seems to be growing, and besides it is faced with newer types
of competition which threaten to make further large inroads
into railroad traffic and revenues. Despite the spectacular
industrial recovery experienced by this country over the
past four years, the railroad industry has failed to show
anything like comparable improvement.
Over the past years the railroads have failed to handle
their property accounts conservatively, with the result that
they are still maintaining much inefficient equipment and yet
they have not retired or even reduced obligations which were
issued in order to pay for the now obsolete and inefficient
assets. The industry has predicated its financing upon its
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long-term stability which no longer seems to be assured. It
has willingly or unwillingly followed the principle that im-
provements and extensions should be financed by new capital
issues and has done practically nothing to reduce its obliga-
tions. In other words, the railroad industry in this country
is now faced with financial difficulties which are inherit-
ances of past mistaJies and which unfortunately are being
encountered at the very time when the railroad business itself
is being threatened by competition from other methods of trans
portation.
Over the long-term the railroads face three fundamental
obstacles which will effectively prevent the regaining of
their former earning power. First in importance is the in-
evitable and irresistible drift of the more profitable
freight traffic to other modes of transportation, particularly
motor trucks, pipe lines and water carriers. The second
obstacle in importance is the competition from the private
automobile which has resulted in unprofitable passenger ser-
vice operations since 1929. And thirdly - the reduction in
the exporting of wheat and cotton, a factor which has been
magnified in the past few years by droughts and by Adminis-
tration policies artificially boosting commodity prices.
There are a number of near-term problems which are cur-
rently handicapping the railroads such as the Revenue Act
of 1936, imposing a 7 per cent to 27 per cent tax upon un-
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distributed earnings. For the well situated roads it will
penalize their refunding of debt as new issues must contain
sinking fund provisions and the tax must be paid on the
sinking fund monies. As for the weaker roads, many of them
stand in dire need of rehabilitation. If this were to be
accomplished by appropriating surplus earnings the latter would
be severely penalized. Although it is very probable that this
tax will either be repealed or modified, it, nevertheless, is
now in operation.
Another problem is overcapitalization, largely funded
debt with its crushing burden of fixed charges which to a
large extent has denied the railroads any flexibility in
their rate structures.
The railroads once enjoyed a monopoly on the nation's
transportation business, they participated in the growth of
the country and their securities were attractive investments.
At the present time, this situation no longer exists, as
competing agencies have taken the more profitable and less
variable traffic. iMot only are the railroads being oppressed
by debt and handicapped by inadequate current financial re-
sources. Inflexible plant and burdensome legislation, they
are dependent to an ever increasing degree upon heavy industry
traffic which rapidly decreases during periods of sustained
business depression.
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FUTURE OF MERICAN RAILROADS
The weakness of the railroads will not be climaxed
"by any large scale failures during the next few years. It
is apparent that the Federal Government will continue a
policy of sup vorting border line railroads for some time to
come, iiut as time passes the chronic ailments of the rail-
roads will so undermine their financial structures and eco-
nomic position that during the next depression, unless some
unforseen beneficial change takes place, or government owner
ship, 75 to 80 per cent of the railroad mileage in this
country will be forced into receivership, and under com-
pulsion their assets will be revalued and their capitaliza-
tions reduced. This major operation on railroad capitali-
zations is inevitable - no mergers, no rate changes, no com-
promises with labor, no reduced taxes or RFC loans can do
more than postpone the inevitable day when railroad capital-
izations must be reduced to a supportable size.
INVESTMENT STATUS
In reviewing the securities of American railroads it
is very difficult to find more than a handful which seem
eligi^l® for inclusion in that limited class of safe in-
vestments which investors may feel safe in ovming on a long-
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term basis. However, a few American railroads have been
managed far better than the average and the securities of
these few may satisfy the requirements of a good invest-
ment status. However, the investor must be certain that
the roads in question v/ill be able to maintain their grov;th
and position in American economy and will not be pulled
under by the failures of surrounding roads. There are a
few bituminous carrying roads which on the who Is cannot be
subjected to the criticism which is generally applied to
the whole industry. However, the investor must bear in
mind that the shifts in the use of the various fuels and the
greater use of electric power may at some time or other in
the future make serious inroads in the traffic of these bi-
tuminous carriers. There are a few roads which are still
succTSsful both in an operating and financial capacity in
the West. Here again it is advisable to study carefully
the outlook for American agriculture and especially of zhe
future development of particular regions. There are a
number of railroads dependent upon one particular ccamodity
for the difference between profit or loss. Thus, some of
the G-ranger roads may be seriously affected by a curtail-
ment in wheat production, or a falling off in our exports
of whert, or perhaps by the use of new routes for shipping
wheat abroad.
As can be understood readily, the outlook for traffic
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varies widely in LJie various regions and as t-o individual
commodities. Each region served presents a widely different
set of conditions and almost every road in a given region
has its peculiar problems. For example - New England's
railroads are essentially terminal properties with consid-
erable branch line mileage exposed to intensive highway com-
petition. Moreover, some of wew England's largest industries
have been permanently crippled by economic pressure and
operating handicaps. Railroads in the South are faced with
the problem of declining exports of cotton due to low-cost
foreign production. In fact, each railroad has its own
particular problems which must be carefully analyzed to de-
termine the status of its securities.

PART II
COMPANY ANALYSIS
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ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RY.
Chartered in Kansas more than three quarters of a
century ago, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe has become
one of the most important and prosperous railroads of the
United States, The road's 13,227 miles of lines constitute
the nation's most extensive steam carrier system. The lines
stretch from Chicago westward through the Kansas City Gate-
way to San Francisco and Los Angeles, and southward to the
Gulf, at Galveston, The road dominates much of the richest
Central Western agricultural territory with a veritable net-
work of lines in Kansas. The main line follows the southern
transcontinental route along the old Santa Fe Trc.il and is
double tracked practically all the way from Chicago to Los
Angeles,
Capitalization
With funded debt outstanding at only >^23,249 per mile
of road, Atchison is more conservatively capitalized than
is the industry as a whole or than other roads in the same
territory. The road's bonded indebtedness of .^310,000,000
at the 1936 year end comprised only 45 per cent of total
capital; when viewed in the light of the road's demonstrated
earning power this is quite favorable. The road is one of
the distinct few with funded debt amounting to less than
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half of total capitalization. There is also outstanding
|124, 172,800 in 5% non-cumulative preferred stock and 2,427-
060 shares of common with a par value of |100 per share.
The sound capital structure contributes to the Atchison's
ability to weather economic storms.
Traffic
Except for concentration in agricultural and manu-
factured products, Atchison's traffic is well diversified.
In the 1920' s, petroleum and its products became important
revenue producers, and while the bonanza period of this de-
velopment has probably passed, such traffic supplied 13.87%
of 1936 freight revenues - outranking all other single com-
modities .
Ratio of Freight Commodities to Total Operating Revenue
Products
of Ap;ri,
Animals
& Prods,
Products
of i.Iines
Products
of Forest
Mfrs.
& Mis.
1932 26.77 5.69 4.74 1.18 21.89
1933 21.98 6.12 5.29 1.53 25.92
1934 26.48 7.85 6.69 2.26 33.84
1935 25.07 5.71 6.26 2.80 36.71
1936 23.09 4.64 6.28 3.17 39.71
Mundy's - Earning Power of Railroads - Page 203
As can be seen by referring to the above table i.ifrs,
& Misc. is the largest item closely follov/ed by Products of
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Agriculture. Atchison originates the unusual prooortion
of about 80 per cent of its own freight which, coupled with
the fact that it serves basic and diverse activities lends
stability to traffic volume.
Atchison is somewhat less dependent upon passenger
traffic than the average Class 1 road and its experience in
this division is less disastrous than the average. In 1936
revenue from passenger operations was only 9.93/^ of total
operating revenue.
Earnings
The Atchison has established itself as one of the most
dependable earners in the railroad industry. In the 20 's
the road reaped rich rewards and common stock earnings
mounted swiftly, reaching a peak of ^22.69 a share in 1929
and covering fixed charges by the wide margin of 5.36 times.
The excellent earnings record of the Atchison can best
be illustrated by the following table.
Avail, for ^Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs. Charges Earned
1921 151,879,660 $12, 548, 006 4.13
1922 46,533,530 12,151,159 3.83
1923 53,707,014 11,619,213 4.62
1924 53,771,294 11,619,488 4,63
1925 57,710,554 11,552,620 5.00
1926 72,120,595 11,489,100 6.28
1927 50,899,839 11,145,722 5.46
1928 61,394,253 11,463,821 5.36
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Avail, for *Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs. Charges Earned
1929 <^74,185,197 #13,148,393 5.64
1930 50,382,552 -13,033,753 3.87
1931 36,248,291 13,146,600 2.76
1932 20,672,203 13,127,196 1.57
1933 16,738,821 13,040,150 1.28
1934 19,972,606 12,971,292 1.54
1935 22,482,340 12,928,025 1.74
1936 23,005,966 13,007,840 1.77
Including interest on adjustment bonds.
The depression record of the Atchison is far better than
that for the industry as a whole in respect to sup ort of
capitalization. Fixed charges were earned in every year,
largely due to a conservative capitalization, for gross
revenues of the system fell even more sharply between 1929
and the low point in 1933 than did those for the industry as
a whole. The decline was 55.2^ versus 50.7^. However,
fixed charges at the start of the depression - 1929 - re-
quired only 5% of gross revenues as compared with 11.4^ for
the industry as a whole. By 1933 fixed charges required
11^ of gross revenues while those of the industry as a
v/hole required 22
During the depression, the road*s earnings declined
precipitously, and from its own operations it failed to
cover preferred dividend requirements in 1932 through 1936.
Non-operating income, however, was sufficient to show such
requirements covered in all years except 1933, in which year
§4,80 a share was declared. Common stock dividends have
been paid in all years except 1933, but the rate has been
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reduced from $10 to |2,
In the three years 193^-36 investments in unconsolidated
affiliates have served to offset fluctuating railroad earnings
and contributed approximately hofo of the parent company's
net income. The more important of these affiliates are oil
and trucking firms and their earnings will no doubt increase
during the next few years, however, their dividends to
Atchison probably will be reduced,
While there have been many contributory causes the main
reason for the collapse in operating earnings during the
depression was the approximate 50^ decline in freight tonnage
from 1929 levels. The failure to record any substantial
recovery until 1937 may be ascribed to crop failures or un-
settled markets for agricultural products affecting both
outbound and inbound traffic.
Near Term Outlook
Although the Atchison may be temporarily affected by
the adverse business conditions throughout the country and
1938 earnings may not exceed those of 1937 or 1936, earnings
should, nevertheless, be sufficient to cover fixed charges
and to show moderate earnings on the common. The road's
ability to weather the depression and to maintain an excellent
financial condition is indicative of its strength.
Current finances may be considered exemplary. On Sept-
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ember 30, 1937, the Company's report to the ICC revealed
that current assets, including cash of |20, 847,000, amounted
to 159,627,000 and were more than two and one-half times
the current liabilities of #22,144,000. As there are no
maturities of any importance before 194o when #5,529,000
San Francisco & San Joaquin Valley Ry. 1st 5s, mature, the
road's near-term outlook is very satisfactory.
Longer Term Outlook
The Atchison originates the unusual proportion of
about 80 per cent of its own freight which coupled with the
fact that it serves basic and diverse activities lends
stability to traffic volume in spite of the uncertainities
of crop yields. The road was a large earner prior to the
depression and the conditions of its territory have not
changed to alter the company's economic position to any
great extent and with due consideration being given to in-
creased co3ts and increased rates, earnings of the Atchison
should improve considerably over those of the present
although former earning power may never be regained-
Although expenditures for maintenance were sharply
cut during the depression, depreciation charges were
virtually unchanged, exceeding #11,000,000 in each year.
Hence, in the aggregate, Atchison's maintenance expenditures
^ including depreciation) declined less than those of the

Class 1 roads as a whole.
The Company's equipment is somewhat below the average
age and is numerically adequate and as serviceable as that
of most roads. Atchison has installed stream-lined passenger
equipment on its Chicago to Los Angeles run, and has air-
conditioned its leadin.-^ trains. It is also experimenting
with high-powered, diesel-electric engines, and has speeded
up its passenger and freight train schedules to meet com-
petition. All things considered the Atchison's strategic
position, moderate capitalization, strong finances, and
capable management place it in a very favorable position
and the road should capitalize upon any growth the South-
western territory may experience.
Investment Status
The Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe has for a good many
years been one of the strongest roads in the country. Its
ability to cover fixed charges throughout the depression in-
dicate its financial stability. The road's bonds occupy an
enviable position among high-grate railroad securities and
could profitably be included in conservative portfolios.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Ratings Hi^h Low
A^'* Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Lst 4s 1958 114 110
A** Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe 1st 4s 1965 107 103
A^'^-* Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe G-en. 4s 1995 II6 107
A** Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Adj. 43 1995 112 100
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Poor'
s
Ratings
A* Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
A^^ Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
Q*4f Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
B Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
Price Range
1937
High Lov/
Gonv. Deb. 43 1955 110 105
Conv. Deb. 4| 1948 111 105
5% Preferred 107 91
Common 88 59
The first mortgage bonds as v;ell as the General and
Adjustment 4s are suitable for accounts requiring the highest
degree of safety. The convertible debentures are suitable
for accounts demanding safety of principal but able to accept
the risk of market swings typical of convertible issues.
The Preferred stock is a medium grade investment suitable
for accounts requiring a large yield and able to assume the
risks involved in medium grade securities. The Common stock
is a dividend paying speculation and is subject to wide
market fluctuations.
j
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ATLANTIC COAST LINE
The Atlantic Coast Line extends from a niimber of
terminal points in southern Florida north along the Atlantic
Seaboard to Norfolk and Richmond, Virginia, where connections
are made affording outlets to Washington and Baltimore. Con-
nections are made with the Louisville and Nashville at Mont-
gomery and Birmingham, Alabama, and in northern Florida
affording outlets to the territory served by that road. The
lines of the Louisville and Nashville extend southwest to
Mobile and New Orleans and north to Mississippi and Ohio
River crossings. A connection at New Albany, Indiana,
affords an entrance to the Chicago area. (For an analysis
of the Louisville & Nashville see page 109.)
Capitalization
The road's capital structure is divided into 63.6^
funded debt and 36.4^ stock of which only 0,1^ is preferred.
While on the surface the funded debt of ^153 > 489, 000 appears
high, it is actually very low on a per mile basis - only
$29,900. Moreover, if the equity in Louisville & Nashville
represented by a 51% controlling stock interest, is set off
against funded debt the effect is to reduce it to very con-
servative proportions. The proportion of total capital-
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ization comprised of debt is sufficiently large to afford
a strong degree of levera^ie for the common shares. Taken
as a whole the capitalization approaches the danger point
as can be seen by the fact that the average percentage
earned on total capitalization for the past six years was
only 2.17;;^, This is not a satisfactory condition.
Traffic
The road is essentially a carrier of consumer goods.
Normally about 30% of revenues is received from hauling
agricultural products. Oranges and grapefruit are the most
important items in this category accounting for about 12%
to 18% depending upon the size of the crops. Products of
mines ordinarily account for about 15% of total revenues and
manufactures and miscellaneous approximately 23%»
The most important sources of revenue and their ratio
to total operating revenue are as follows:
Fruit & Refined Bitum.
Year Pass. Vegetables Pete. Oils Coal
1932 12.40% 26.00^ 8.13.^ 2.01^
1933 11.14 26.09 7.93 2.30
1934 12.74 20.04 8.42 2.4l
1935 14.24 16.51 6,78 2.62
1936 15.51 16.49 4.62 2.87
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page2l4
As can readily be seen passenger traffic has always
been important to the Atlantic Coc.st Line, being a major
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factor in the road's prosperity during the Florida boom
days. Although earnings from this source have suffered
acutely from automobile competition, and although basic
fares were reduced to l-g- cents per mile in December 1953>
passenger business supplied more than 15% of total revenues
in 1936. Although return to the 2 cents per mile rate has
been authorized by the ICC there is little prospect that
passenger operations will contribute much to net earnings,
Less-than-car-load traffic is still somewhat heavier
than for the average road, making the Atlantic Coast Line
vulnerable to highway cora-'jetition. Although consumers'
goods traffic is of chief importance to the Atlantic Coast
Line, the Company owns 51% (596,700 shares) of the Louis-
ville & Nashville, which is essentially a heavy industry
carrier, much dependent upon the movement of bituminous coal
and iron an steel products, and
,
thus, Atlantic Coast Line •
has a stake in mining and industrial production.
Earnings
The collapse in the Atlantic Coast's earnings during the
depression was one of the major disappointments of the rail-
road investment market.- In the tv/enties earnings were sub-
stantial and fixed charges were covered more than twice in
every year. A close examination of the causes of the collaps
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in earnings in 1932 reveals the fact that the reduction in
Louisville & Nashville's dividend from 47 a share in 1929
and 1930 to $6 in 1931, $2 in 1932 and to nothing in 1933
had a tremendous influence on Coast Line's final result.
After 1932, the road lost a large portion of its citrous
fruit traffic to trucks and ocean lines while passenger
operations became less profitable.
The following table clearly shows the splendid earnings
record throughout the twenties and the spectacular .collapse
in the first few years of the depression.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs, Charges Earned
1921 #9,147,191 17,356,622 1.24
1922 18,930,481 7,326,407 2,58
1923 20,130,969 7,333,896 2.75
1924 20,538,547 7,262,703 2.83
1925 25,764,943 7,281,801 3.54
1926 23,936,518 7,416,644 3.23
1927 17,265,657 7,409,748 2.33
1928 15,909,193 7,465,590 2.13
1929 19,256,490 7,334,983 2.63
1930 13,553,749 7,299,157 1.86
1931 9,170,205 7,149,347 1.28
1932 354,763 7,039,992 0.05
1933 4,714,070 7,099,858 0.66
1934 6,507,944 7,003,422 0.93
1935 4,059,532 6,588,987 0.62
1936 8,405,065 6,489,910 1.30
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 218,
Although gross for the Atlantic Coast Line did not fall
as rapidly as did that of the railroad industry as a whole
the depression record as regards support of capitalization
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was poor. This was due in large part to a greater than aver-
age operating ratio. At the beginning of the depression, the
Company's operating ratio was only slightly higher than that
for the industry as a whole. However, by 1932 operating
ratio was 36,6% as compared with 76,9^ for the industry as
a whole. This was due in part to the unusually precipitous
drop in gross in 1932 compared with 1931, due to the impover-
ished condition of the South which could not be offset despite
the management's efforts to economize. Since 1932 the Coast
Line's operating ratio has been reduced at the expense, partly
of maintenance. The ratio for 1936 was still high however.
In this yecr there was virtually no increase in maintenance
expenses which makes the higher figure even more significant,
.
The road's traffic density is extremely light with much
of it representing perishable commodities v/hich make fast
service imperative and, therefore, it would be expected that
maintenance charges would be correspondingly light. However,
hardly in quite the degree that they were in the period
1933-37.
Recovery from the depression was fairly sv/ift. During
1936, when all classes of freight moved in increased volume
as a result of fairly satisfactory crop conditions and better
levels of activity in most lines of business, Atlantic
Coast Line covered its fixed charges 1.30 times. Contri-
buting largely to the road's good showing in 1936 was an in-

52
crease in other income from <ip2, 445,000 in 1935 to ^4,832,-
000, Most of the increase in other income resulted from
more profitable operations of the controlled Louisville &
Nashville, which declared dividends aggregating ^6 per share
on its common stock in 1936 compared with #2.50 per share
during 1935. In 1937 an above average citrous fruit crop in
the South coupled with a crop failure in California brought
relatively good earnings for the full year although operations
in the last quarter were not particularly satisfactory.
Debt has been serviced throughout the iepression without
difficulty. However, payments on the preferred stock were
discontinued in May 1932 and no furthsr payments were made
until November 1934, when the regular dividend v/as declared,
and since continued. Dividends on the Common were paid
from 1901 to 1932 when they were discontinued. Resumption
of dividends occurred in 1936 when ^1 was paid. The dividend
was increased to ^1.50 in 1937.
Near Term Outlook
Although the Atlantic Coast Line was unfavorably affected
by the sudden drop in business activity in the latter part
of 1937, it v/as able to operc.te profitably in ev^ry month.
This is in quite a contrast to a good many roads. For the
full yesr 1937 fixed charges were earned 1.38 times. In com-
parison with railroads in general the financial condition of
the road was excellent on November 30, 1937. Current assets,
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including cash of $13,601,823, amounted to $22,371,210 and
were almost three times current liabilities of 17,65^,679.
Fortunately the road has only $2,005,000 in funded debt
maturing within six months. This debt will be easily met.
With anything like normal business in 1938 the road should
cover fixed charges by a substantial margin. ^Vhile the Atlanti
Coast Line will no doubt receive large dividends on its holding
of Louisville & Nashville stock, it has a souni business of
its own which should improve steadily along with general bus-
iness activity throughout the country.
Longer Term Outlook
Although the Atlantic Coast Line is quite substantially
capitalized it, nevertheless is able to operate at a satis-
factory rate in anything like normal times. To be sure the
road is dependent to a considerable extent upon its income
from the Louisville & Nashville, riowever, this income is
fairly secure. In normal times earnings of the Coast Line
alone are sufficient to service its funded debt.
At the peak of the real estate boom in 1925 the Atlantic
Coast Line showed a net income of $18,483, l'^2 equivalent to
nearly $27 a common share. Since that date the road has lost
a large percentage of its citrous fruit business to trucks
and ocean lines, and former earnings may never be reattained.
Although the territory actually traversed does not offer
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scope for extensive industrial development, the road's earn-
ing power over the years ahead should be affected favorably
by economic growth of other southern sections tributciry to
the Atlantic Coast Line as a whole.
In viev/ of the fact that the Atlantic Coast Line is in
a position to benefit by the growing industrialization of the
South and its ownership of the Louisville & Nashville is be-
coming increasingly more valuable, it appears likely that the
road has prospects for long-term growth and barring unfor-
seen economic changes should experience favorable earnings
over the years ahead.
Investment Status
The sharp drop in earnings experienced by the Atlantic
Coast Line during the depression caused a large number of
investors to feel that the road had lost its former excellent
standing and in view of this belief the Comcany's securities
dropped to very low levels. Although earnings have shown a
substantial recovery since 1932 and the road seems to have re-
gained much of its lost ground, the Company's securities have
not attained their former investment status and cannot as yet
be considered prime investments.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Ratings High Low
A Atlantic Coast Line 1st 4s 1952 106 85
B** Atlantic Coast Line (lAV) 4s 1952 100 74
B** Atlantic Coast Line Unified 4|-s 1964 100 74
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Poor '
s
Ratings
Price Range
1937
high Low
B** Atlantic Coast Line Notes 5s 19^5
B Atlantic Coast Line Common Stock
106
55
86
18
The variations in market price during 1937 are too wide
to warrant the inclusion of any of the bonds in conservative
accounts. However, since the future of this road appears
quite favorable the bonds are suitable for those accounts
willing to asf'ume the risk involved in purchasing bonds below
the top crrade. As a speculation the bonds are quite attractive.
The Common stock may be considered a fairly good railroad
speculation.
I
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BALTIMORE & OHIO
The Baltimore & Ohio is the third largest of the East-
ern Trunk Lines and operates more than 6,396 miles of track
mainly in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana
and Illinois. The lines extend westv/ard from the Atlantic
Seacoast at Baltimore through the coal fields and industrial
districts of West Virginia and Pennsylvania, through Cnicago
and St. Louis to the western terminus in Kansas City. The
road reaches such important industrial centers as Rochester,
Buffalo, i-'ittsburgh, Cleveland, Toledo, Cincinnati and Louis-
ville. Entrance to New York is secured through the controlled
Central Railroad of New Jersey.
Capitalization
While the B&O's proportion of debt is not so high as
to constitute an immediate threat to corporate stability,
it is not far removed from the upper reasonable limit. At
the 1936 year-end funded debt of s?620, 477, 652, excluding
RFC and other emergency loans, accounted for 66.32^ of total
capitalization and amounted to -^^110, 000 per mile of road.
^58,863,162 of preferred stock contributing 4.29/6 was followed
by common stock in ^he amount of ^256,295,348 making the
balance of 27.39^. If the short-term emergency loans had been
included debt would have accounted for 68.24 per cent of the
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capitalization total. Including these loans the funded, debt
of the B&O assumes serious proportions.
As a consequence of the heavy capitalization fixed
charges absorb a large proportion of revenues. Including
|1, 115, 259 lease rentals, the Baltimore & Ohio's fixed charges
amounted to ;if32, 893,024 which was equivalent to 22.25 per cent
of the 9147,816,918 gross revenue total. This v/as a consid-
erably larger percentage than was paid by the oi-her Eastern
Trunk lines.
Of course the heavy funded debt skyrockets the common
share earnings when earnings exceed fixed charge requirements
by any substantial margin. Thus, in 1928 v;hen charges were
covered just under two times^ earnings ran to ,?17.20 a share.
However, the reverse is equally true and in 1934 when fixed
charges were covered only 0.88 times a deficit of ;|2,4l was
shovm on the common. The foregoing serves to show not only
why the Baltimore & Ohio bonds are ranked below the strictly
prime grade but also why the stock attracts a speculative
following.
Traffic
The Baltimore & Ohio has been called a carrier of the
"Prince and Pauper" type because of the wide fluctuations
in earning power tracing to a large dependence on the coal,
iron and steel industries.
I
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As the following table indicates the largest percentage
of the line's revenues is derived from manufactures a.nd mis-
cellaneous with products of mines a close second.
Ratio of Freight Commodity Classes to Total Operating Rev.
Products Animals Products Products Mfrs,
of A,Q:ri. & Prods. of Mines of Forest & Mis.
1932 6.88^ 6.00^ 3^.66% 2.5^% 30.48^
1933 6.47 5.68 36.88 2.37 31.90
1934 6.18 5.81 36.46 2.51 33.29
1935 5.63 4.21 35.61 2.93 36.33
1936 5.90 3.57 36.81 3.15 37.03
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 225.
The most important commodity carried is bituminous
coal, which makes up approximately of total tonnage and
almost 30f^ of total freight revenues. The bituminous traffic
of the road has varied almost directly with the country's
total production. It is significant to note that the inroads
of competitive fuels and more efficient fuel utilization
militate against an increasing consumption of bituminous coal
and the long-term trend of B&O's bituminous traffic is dovm-
ward.
The Miscellaneous and Manufacturing traffic is to a
large extent composed of iron and steel products which pro-
duce in good times more than 10 per cent of the Company's
freight revenues. Activity in steel benefits B&O in two ways
the road carries steel, and steel activity demands the ship-
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ment of coal. Therefore, it is readily seen that earnings
of the road are heavily dependent upon steel activity. The
relationship between steel activity and the Baltimore & Ohio's
earnings is shown in the following table.
Total Finished
Operating Steel
Year Revenue Tonnap^e
1Q29 #245,000,000 41.1
1930 .207,000,000 29.5
1931 173,000,000 19.2
1932 126,000,000 10.5
1933 132,000,000 16.7
1934 136,000,000 19.0
1935 142,000,000 24.0
1936 169,000,000 33.8
In view of the Baltimore & Ohio's dependence upon capital
goods industries a profitable traffic level depends to a large
degree on sustained activity in steel production and other
heavy industries. Passenger revenues amount to only 7 per cent
of the total. Freight revenues contribute about ninety per
cent, and about forty per cent of freight revenues is repres-
ented by lines directly connected with the iron and steel ind-
ustry. These are chiefly bituminous coal, iron ore, coke, iron
and steel "fifth class" and manufactured steel products.
The significance of this dependence upon steel activity
is clearly illustrated by the fact that a decline of 30 per
cent to 40 per cent in the production of steel might easily
bring about an almost equal decline in the allied traffic.
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and even if revenues from other sources remained relatively
stable such a recession in the "heavy" category would rep-
resent a decline of 15% or more in total revenues.
Earnings
As previously pointed out the prosperity of the Baltimore
& Ohio is dependent upon heavy industry activity and freight
rates - primarily coal rates. Earnings have varied v/idely
over the last sixteen ye8,rs following closely the trend in
industrial activity.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs. Charp;es Earned
1921 130,542,410 424,153,519 1,26
1922 • 28,341,506 23,966,132 1.18
1923 46,973,161 24,551,125 1.91
1924 42,335,981 26,016,292 1.63
1925 48,312,343 27,518,834 1.76
1926 56,539,867 28,930,108 1,95
1927 52,723,421 30,091,076 1.75
1928 56,098,698 26,997,767 2.08
1929 56,792,465 28,024,558 2.03
1930 50,579,636 29,155,865 1.74
1931 34,066,534 30,263,557 1.13
1932 27,060,988 33,395,966 0.81
1933 33,920,102 33,715,330 1.01
1934 28,787,510 32,613,262 0.88
1935 29,440,360 32,621,269 0.90
1936 37,431,999 32,893,024 1.14
Source
:
Mundy ' s "Earn ing Power of Railroads" Page 230.
A study of the table reveals that in normal times the
Baltimore & Ohio is able to support its capitalization, but
periods of slack business are quickly reflected by a drop in
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earnings. As heavy industries are more seriously affected
by slumps than othor tyoes of activity it is not surprising
that the Baltimore & Ohio had a difficult time during the
depression and it was not until heavy industrial production
surged sharply upward in 1936 that the Baltimore & Ohio's
earning power showed material improvement. It is safe to
say that, barring an unforseen change, the earnings of the
B&O will fluctuate in syi^ipathy with the activity of heavy
Industries and that earnings will be satisfactory when bus-
iness is booming and will be insufficient to cover fixed
charges when business is much below normal.
Near Term Outlook
In view of the Baltimore & Ohio's dependence upon the
capital goods industries - which have experienced one of
the sharpest contractions in business history - the road
has been dealt a severe blow. In place of a profit for
1937 which it was earlier estimated would be sufficient to
cover fixed charges 1,01 times, the road now estimates that
it will show a loss of ^1, 352, 000. The road's problems
are not, however, associated solely with the current de-
pression. It now owes the RFC |79,S42,823, probably the
largest sum any carrier is owing to that Government unit.
Continued solvency of the 3&0 depends upon the road*s
ability to meet interest payments and to take care of equip-

ment trust securities maturing in 1933 ar- well as <^50,000,-
000 of secured ^^fo notes and substantial Government loans
maturing in 1939. The ability to pay interest and to meet
the maturities depends upon a revival in business activity
and upon the size of the expected rate increases. The object
of the ICC in granting higher freight rates is to keep rail-
roads, like the B&O, solvent and investors can be assured
that everything possible in the way of rate increa.ses ?/ill
be done to keep railroads from bankruptcy. Moreover, it
appears evident that the recovery movement has some distance
to g;o before it reaches a cyclical pea.k and indications
now point toward a revival of business in the middle half
of 1938. That business will be better in 1939 than in 1937
is very probable and conditions will no doubt be such that
the B&C's maturing loans will be extended or refunded with-
out any serious difficulties.
Longer Term Outlook
Although the Baltimore & Ohio will no doubt remain
solvent for the next few years it has generated conditions
which make long continued solvency very improbable.
Before the depression the road was spending more than
^80,000,000 a year on total maintenance. '.Vith the advent
of the depression, such charges were cut sharply to help
meet interest requirements and estimated arrears in main-
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tenance now total roughly ^plOO,000,000. (Poor's estimate)
The road Is dependent upon the capital goods industries and
particularly the steel industry and earnings are, therefore,
very vulnerable to a decline in general business activity.
Company's heavy RFC loans and large near-term maturities
preclude any substantial improvement over the immediate
future and it is likely that the next depression will catch
the 3&0 in a much worse condition than in 1929. The road's
ability to weather another depression is open to question.
Average earnings cannot support the Company's capitalization,
its bituminous traffic and passenger traffic are declining,
it is meeting heavy competition from trucks and its etrnings
are dependent upon a very variable and none too profitable
traffic.
Investment Status
The Baltimore & Ohio's capitalization is dangerously
out of line with earning power and it is highly improbable
that the road will continue for many more years vithout
a capital readjustment.
The securities of a company with a questionable future
can have no investment merit. iThile there may be a decided
speculative movement in the various lialtimore & Ohio issues
during the next few years the longer-term position of the
road is so insecure that none of its securities are suitable
for conservative accounts.
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Price Rang
Poor's 1937
Ratings HiKh Low
A Baltimore &, Ohio 1st 4s 1948 109 73
A Baltimore & Ohio 1st 5s 1948 116 78
Baltimore & Ohio P.L.E.&W.V. Ref. 4s 194l 105 67
3^ Baltimore & Ohio S.W. Div. Ist 5s 1950 108 51
Baltimore & Ohio T.C. Div. Lst Ref. 4s 1959 99 50
B Baltimore & Ohio Ref. & Gen. Mtge 5s 1995 94 38
B Baltimore & Ohio Ref. & Gen. Mtge 6s 1995 103 43
B Baltimore & Ohio Ref. & Gen. Mtge 5s 2000 93 36
B Baltimore & Ohio Ref. & Gen. Mtge 5s 1996 93 37
B Baltimore & Ohio Securred Notes 4-g-s 1939 102 50
Baltimore & Ohio Conv. 4ts i960 82 30
C Baltimore & Ohio Preferred 47 10
Baltimore & Ohio Common 40 8
The table printed above graphically shows the drastic
market movement of the Baltimore & Ohio securities over the
past year. This violent market movement suggests the inherent
speculative nature of the securities of this road.
iI
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BANGOR & ARQCoTQCK RAILROAD
Bangor & Aroostook's approximately 600 miles of road
are all located in northern Maine. The lines of the rail-
road extend from tidewater at oeersport north to Van Buren
on the St. John River at the Canadian boundary, a distance
of approximately 259 miles, the balance of the mileage is
composed of branch and connecting lines and industrial
spurs woven through the agricultural and lumber producing
territory of northern Maine. The railroad serves the
largest lumber and richest agricultural districts in New
England anl also serves one of the largest paper mills in
the country. The chief connecting carrier is the Maine
Central Railroad but there are also connections with the
Canadian Pacific Railway and v/ith the Canadian National
Railways.
Capitalization
\^/hile funded debt of -^16, 421, 000 approximates 60 per
cent of total capitalization, the debt per mile is net high
amounting to only ^27,500 per mile of track. Outsts-nding
capital stock consists of 38,280 shares of §100 par value
5^ preferred stock and l4l,792 shares of -^50 par value.
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common. The common stock has had the benefit of earnings
even in years of depression and has profited from the leverage
of a substantial prior capitalization in years of prosper-
ity. In 1937, 43,^30,000 7?o preferred was replaced by
^3,828,000 5% preferred each share of which is convertible
to July 1, 19'^1 into two shares of common, upon the payment
of 45 ^ share. Thereafter, the additional payment is in-
creased. This refinancing saves the company §52,200 each
year in preferred dividends.
Traffic
Known as the "Potato Road" the Bangor and Aroostook
receives 33% to 45^ of its freight tonnage and 55% to 65%
of its freight revenues in normal years from potatoes.
Passenger revenues, as shown by the table printed below,
are only nominal and the only other important revenue producers
•
are wood pulp, paper and fertilizer.
Products
Passenger Potatoes Paper of Forest
1932 3.78,^ 55.^0,^ 9.03.^ 5.13^
1933 3.64 59.05 8.73 3.54
1934 4.43 53.72 8.52 5.23
1935 4.15 51.34 9.36 8.31
1936 3.83 49.05 10.82 6.83
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 240
The road is unique in being dependent so largely for
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its revenues and earnings upon a single crop. During the
depression, large potato crops were raised, and despite low
pric?s, they meant large tonnage to the railroad and profits
held up exceptionally well.
Earnings
Earnings were remarkably sts>.bl8 during the late tv;enties,
and reached a peak of ,p9.27 a share in 1930. The road showed
substantial earnings throughout the depression, although
subnormal potato harvests in 1930 and 1935 meant a fairly
sharp reduction in share profits. However, a:' the following
tableshows, the falling off in earnings was very slight in
comparison with the drastic shrinkage experienced by most
roads during this period.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed ChRS. Charg.es Earned
1921 ^1,269,323 11,021,370 1.24
1922 1,708,644 1,032,171 I.65
1923 1,650,032 1,055.121 1.56
1924 1,782,745 1,059,995 1.68
1925 1,763,628 1,040,000 1.70
1926 1,947,241 1,032,915 1.89
1927 2,138,108 998,385 2.14
1928 1,948,397 965,320 2.02
1929 2,334,390 935,956 2.49
1930 2,426,371 868,609 2.79
1931 1,435,864 812,731 1.77
1932 1,509,442 807,949 1.87
1933 1,793,789 800,213 2.24
1934 1,730,993 783,599 2.21
1935 1,622,497 • 748,744 2.17
1936 1,469,922 722,671 2.03
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 240.
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The road receives a comparatively small amoiint of revenue
from shipments of lumber, pulpwood and newsprint and is there-
fore, not affected seriously by adverse business conditions.
The road's stability of earnings can be demonstrated by re-
ferring to the earnings for 1937, a year in which carriers
of hervy industry goods recorded poor earnings in comparison
with Lhose of the previous year. For the year 1937 the
Bangor & Aroostook reported a net income of ^845,224 which
compared with >7'^7,251 in 1936 and s.raounted to in earnings
per share, after dividends on the preferred, to 'i?4.6l and
^3.55 respectively. Operating revenues showed a gain of
3.3/^ over those of 1936 and net railway operating income
an increase of 13*1%.
Dividends have been paid upon the common stock since
1903 and upon the preferred since its issue in 1917. By
reason of the dividend record all of the Company's mortgage
bonis have become a legal investment for savings banl^s in
Maine, Massachusetts, Nev; York and other states.
The property has been adequately maintained; all
necessary addition and betterments, improvements and replace-
ments, have been made, and nev/ equipment including heavier
locomotives, has been built or purchased, or otherwise pro-
vided for, v/ith the result that the Company is prepared to
meet fully all demands for transportation service.

Near Term Outlook
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The Bangor & Aroostook ha^' a long record of stable
earnings in spite of its relatively heavy senior capital-
ization and primary dependence upon the Maine potato crop.
Financial condition has been maintained comfortably at all
times by an ?.ble management. On November 30, 1937 current
assets, including cash of fc93,603, amounted to |2, 216,752
or more than three times the current liabilities of ^706,-
733. The road has no near-term maturities, no bank loans
nor floating debt.
Although the current business recession may be reflect-
ed in small movements of lumber, vroodpulp and newsprint, the
main stay, the potato crop is of sizeable proportions and
now awaits shipment. Only satisfactory potato prices are
needed to assure creditable profits over the coming six
months. With both physical and financial condition excell-
ent, any earnings gains could be distributed to stockholders.
Longer Term Outlook
At first glance a road dependent upon a single crop
for prosperity would appear to be too insecure. However,
a glance at the splendid earnings record of the Bangor &
Aroostook throughout the last fifteen ye:, rs does not indi-
cate any weakness, rather its dependence upon the potato
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crop has enabled this road to record consistent earnings.
Even though the Bangor & Aroostook cannot be expected to
participate in any cyclical business recovery in proportion
with the rail systems catering to the "heavy industries",
fairly stable operating results and dividend payments can
be expected.
Investment Status
The road's remarkable record for stability of earnings
marks it ao one of the few depression proof roads. It's
securities have always been highly regarded by investors,
and although the road has no diversity of tral'fic its First
Mortgage bonds are prime investments.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Rat in?,
s
Hip;h Low
A** Bangor & Aroostook 1st 5s 19^3 116 111
A"* Bangor & Aroostook 1st 5s 19'^3 (Pise.) 110 106
A'^^ Bangor & Aroostook (Van B.) 5s 19-^3 110 106
A*- Bangor & Aroostook (St. John) 1st 5s 1939 109 106
A* Bangor & Aroostook Cs. Ref. 4s 1951 108 106
A'^ Bangor & Aroostook Cv. Cs. 4s 1951 108 106
A Bangor & Aroostook 5/^ Conv. Preferred 110 89
B** Bangor & Aroostook Common 45 30
The top bonds of the road the 1st 5s 1943 are suitable
for the most conservative accounts. The other issues, the
5s 1939 and the 4s 1951 are high-grade bonds and are reason-
II
{
{
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ably safe investments. The 5% convertible preferred ranks
fairly high among similar issues and could be included for
income in the conservative stock: account. The Common stock
is a good dividend paying security although, subject as are
all common stocks, to large price changes.
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CANADIAN PACIFIC R.--.IDYAY CO.
The Canadian Pacific, a privately owned transcontin-
ental line operating more than 17,200 miles of track in
Canada as well as controlling some 4,000 additional miles
of trackage in the United States, extends accross the entire
continent. Its lines reach from Halifax and 3t. John on the
Atlantic, and from Q,uebec on the Gulf of the 5t. Lawrence,
to Vancouver on the Pacific. They reach Toronto and Detroit;
through the ownership of the "Soo" they reach Minneapolis
and St. Paul and extend through Minnesota and North Dakota;
through the "Duluth and South Shore" they pass through the
rich iron districts of northern Michigan. A net work of
lines covers Manitoba and extend westv;ard, making the rail-
road the chief forwarding agency in the richest wheat fields
of the continent.
In addition to its railways the Canadian Pacific operates
a fleet of 15 inland steamships and about 42 ocean and
coastal vessels, maintaining communication between Sastem
Canada and European ports and between Y/estern Canacii and
Asiatic and other ports.
The Company owns a chain of fifteen hotels located
throughout the Dominion, The hotels are in the main the
I
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luxury type, located at famous resorts, including the
Chateau Frontenac at Quebec, Banff Springs Hotel at Banff
and the Cha eau Lake Louise at Lake Louise,
Capitalization
The make up of the capital account of the Canadian
pacific differs considerably from the customary style of
American roads. The ratio of long-term indebtedness to
total capitalization is about 51% with capital stock rep-
resenting ^9% thus resulting in a sound balance. Moreover,
total capitalization is not out of proportion to normal
earnings and a large part of the debt is represented by per-
petual debentures, which eliminate refunding problems. Ex-
pansions and acquisitions were financed to a considerable
extend by common stock which accounts for the 13, '^00, 000
shares outstanding, iiVhile this situation improves the
standing of the funded debt it contributes to sluggish market
action for the common shares.
Traffic
'^iThile the diversity of the Canadian Pacific's interests
helps somewhat to stabilize the earning power of the company,
earnings fundamentally reflect the rate of Canadian economic
activity. The controlling factor in the business rate con-
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tinues to be the prosperity of the agricultural provinces,
which are largely dependent upon the size of the wheat crop
and the state of the v:orld market as to price.
The following table shows the important sources of
revenue, and the ratio to total operating revenue.
G-rain and
Passenp:er Grain Products Lumber Coal
1932 1'3A9% 23.29^ 3.82^ 5.7^%
1933 12o50 21.17 4.04 6,57
1934 12.07 17.70 4.52 . 5.84
1935 11.69 16.89 4.97 5.90
1936 11.31 16.06 4.98 6.14
Table 1
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Iiailroads" Page 257.
As can readily be seen grain, and grain products con-
stitute the largest revenue producers with passengers a
fairly close second. The decline in grain revenues from
23.29^ in 1932 to l6.06,^o in 1936 was a result of the wide-
spread drought conditions in western Canada and in the
northwestern United States in recent years.
The following statement of grain handlings of the
Canadian Pacific and Soo Line indicates the severity of the
adverse agricultural conditions which have prevailed since
1930. [The figures represent millions of bushels.)
(
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Grain Handlings
( millions J
Canadian
Pacific Line
Average 1925- 1930 241 46
22
1932 . . . 18
1933 . . . 21
13
1935 . . . 18
11
Average 1931- 1936 153 17
Table 2
As previous periods of drought have been followed by
more favorable growing conditions and since the world's
visible supply of wheat has steadily declined during the last
five years and is now less than in any year since 1923 and
since the average farm price per bushel of wheat was higher
in 1937 than in any year since 1929, there is reason to ex-
pect that the traffic to and from the agricultural areas
served by the Canadian Pacific will, in the next few years,
exceed the average of the lant few years. It is also to be
expected that the agricultural traffic of the Soo Line will
increase from the extraordinarily low level of 1936.
Again refering to table (1) it will be observed that
passenger revenue has steadily declined since 1932. The
cause of this may be directly placed upon the automobile, as
evidenced by the fact that in 1913 the number of passengers
carried on all Canadian railroads was 46,230,765. For the
year 1935 this number had fallen to 20,084,185, despite the
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fact that the country's population had increased by over
3,000,000.
A similar comparison in rep;ard to freight traffic is
of eoual interest. For the year 1913, total tons of freight
carried by all Canadian railways were 106,992,701. For the
calendar year 1935 the total carried was 69, 1-^1, 100. Whatever
may be the combined causes that have resulted in this drastic
change, the resulting effect upon railway revenues will be
readily und3rstood.
While the prosperity of the Canadian Pacific is chiefly
dependent uoon wheat, traffic in live stock, coke, coal and
other products of mines, lumber, plupwood as v;ell as products
of manufacturers contribute a subst ntlal part of gross
revenues. For the most part this traffic, with the exception
of products of manufacturers, is carried by the rails v/ith a
minimum of competition from trucks.
Earnings
The company's earnings reccrd speaks for itself and
for a conservative capitalization.
Year
Avail, for
Fixed Chps.
Fixed
Charges
Times
Earned
1921
1922
1923 48,370,062
pi, 519, 072
13,348,906
13,470,653
3.88
3.51
3.59
i
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*Flxea Times
Charp;es Earned
114,070,287 3.32
• 14,438,517 3.53
14,676,359 3.77
15,378,867 3.30
15,308,698 4.16
16,149,003 3.57
19,159,865 3.00
22,050,364 1.63
23,619,529 1.01
24,388,615 1.05
24,578,026 1.26
24,159,938 1.12
23,913,298 1.25
Avail, for
Year Fixed Chp:3 .
1924 ^46,698,494
1925 .51,012.151
1925 55,401,398
1927 50,792,131
1928 63,622,136
1929 57,626,764
1930 57,541,582
1931 35,884,836
1932 23,877,410
1933 - 25,645,776
1934 - 31,047,817
1935 26,992,022
1936 29,942,482
Includes debenture stock interect and bond interest.
- Before depreciation on Oces.n and Coastal Steamships.
Source: Mundy ' s "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 258
Table 3
A study of the table reveals that earnings were very
satisfactory from 1921 to 1930 and with the advent of the
depression they shrank rapidly. It is interesting to note
however, that gross revenues of the Canadian Pacific fell
less between 1929 and 1933 than did those of United States
roads - 45;:^ versus about 50^. Contributing generously to
Canadian Pacific's earnings during the depression were non-
railway operations. However, Canadian Pacific's recovery
from the depression low point has been at a slower pace than
that of many United States roads. This probably is due, in
part, to the poor agricultural conditions which have per-
sisted for the last few years and to the fact that a large
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portion of income, more than half the total in 1930, was
derived from mine, hotel, steamship and other outside oper-
ations which naturally experienced unusually hard going
during the depression. However, throughout the depression
the Company earnei its fixed interest charges in each year,
a very creditable achievement.
Dividends were maintained at the rate of ^2,50 a share
on the outstanding Ordinary stock, from 1911 to 1931 hut
were omitted sfter April, 1932. There is little prospect
for prompt resumption upon the ordinary stock because the
sfl37»257,000 preference issue effectively prevents the
realization of noteworthy earnings upon the Ordinary shares
when gross revenues are small.
Again referring to table (3) it will be noted that
fixed charges increased from 16, 149,003 in 1929 to vf24,-
578,026 in 1934. This substantial increase was due to ex-
tensive improvements paid for by borrowed funds and due to
the inability of the Soo Line to continue its interest pay-
ments without substantial help from the Canadian Paxific.
Future earnings should benefit by the steady growth
and expansion of industry throughout the Dominion. As
earnings are dependent upon a wide diversity of traffic
the Company's prosperity will reflect general business con-
ditions. However, real substantial earnings cannot be ex-
pected until drought conditions in the Provinces can be over-
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come.
Near Term Outlook
The Canadian Pacific v/eathered the depression in a
very satisfactory fashion and although earnings have not shovm
any substantial increases since the depression this may be
chiefly blamed upon the drought conditions rather than upon
any inherent weakness in the railroad.
The 148,000,000 of five year notes formerly due in 1938
were paid off early in 1936 with proceeds received from the
sale of bonds. Throughout the 4o's substantial maturities
will occur. However, there should be little difficulty met
in carrying out refunding operations.
The transportation systems of Canada are experiencing
a less rapid rise in costs than are domestic rails and they
are facing a less drastic industrial recession. It is fairly
certain, therefore, that the Canadian Pacific 'vill have clear
sailing over the near-term.
Longer Term Outlook
The Canadian Pacific is a soundly financed and ably
managed railroad. Moreover, it carries on an enormous and
widely diversified business and should, therefore, benefit
substantially from the industrial development of Canada which
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appears in long-term prospect. Although the railroad proper
is principally dependent upon agricultural traffic and is
affected by crop conditions which have been unfavorable in
recent years, earnings as a whole have been satisfactory be-
cause of the supplementing income from other operations.
The road's chief competitor is the large Canadian
National Railway System, which is under Governmental owner-
ship. This competition from a Governmentally ovmed rail-
road could be a serious threat to the Canadian Pacific but
for the spirit of cooperation observed by the Canadian Gov-
ernment ,
Currently there is considerable agitation for a con-
solidation of the two systems and it seems very likely that
some alignment will eventually be effected. In the event of
this the funded debt of the Canadian Pacific v/ould probably
receive the guarantee of the Canadian Government. However,
v/ith or v/ithout a consolidation the Canadian Pacific is suf-
ficiently strong to maintain its position and the longer-
term outlook is quite satisfactory.
Investment Status
Although the Canadian Pacific's margin of earnings above
fixed charges during the past five years were not of suffi-
cient size to mark the road as being depression proof, they

81
were, nevertheless, indicative of a fairly secure position.
With the long-term prospects for the development of Canada
quite favorable, the road can be said to be in a progressive
period, more so than most American railroads. In viev/ of i:he
prospects for long-term growth the outlook for the securities
of the Canadian Pacific appear satisfactory.
Price Plange
Poor'
s
1937
Ratinp;s HiKh Low
A* Canadian Pacific Secured Notes 4-|-s 1944 102 100
A Canadian Pacific Collateral Trust 2is 1941 98 95
A Canadian Pacific Conv. Col. Trust 6s 1942 114 102
A Cana^dian Pacific Collateral Trust 4-|-s 1946 106 100
A Canadian Pacific Collateral Trust 4s 1949 103 97
A Canadian Pacific Conv. CoL Trust 3 i-s 1951 102 93
A Canadian Pacific Collateral Trust 5s 1954 111 98
A Canadian Pacific Collateral Trust 4-l-s i960 106 90
Canadian Pacific ^% Perpetual Deb. Stock 99 80
At the present time, based upon past record, the se-
curities of the Canadian Pacific cannot lay claim to the
highest investment status. However, the Secured Notes 4-|-s
1944 are suitable for most accounts. The Collateral Trust
issues as well as the Convertible bonds and the Debentures
are fairly high grade and could be considered as satisfactory
media for investment where market stability is not essential.
The preference stock as well as the common are too
speculative to warrant consideration from conservative accounts
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CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO R/vILWAY CO.
Developed by Van Sweringen interests, and ^5% of its
Common stock held by the Chesapeake Corp. , the Chesapeake &
Ohio operates, largely through o\vnership of over 3,106 miles
of lines extending from the Atlantic Seaboard at Nev;port
News, V irginia, through the West Virginia and Kentucky coal
fields into the Middle tVest industrial region, to the G-reat
Lakes ports and to Chicago, Its lines also serve coal mines
in southern Ohio. Among the important cities served by the
Company's lines are Norfolk, Newport News and Richmond,
Virginia; Washington D.C.; Charleston and Huntington, West
Virginia; Cincinnati, Columbus and Toledo, Ohio; Ashland,
Lexington and Louisville, Kentucky; and Chicago, Illinois.
The Van Sweringens secured control of the Chesapeake &
Ohio in 1923. They soon after made it an active member of
their interlocking interests, so that the road not only holds
substantial stock interests either directly or through sub-
sidiaries in the other Van Sweringen roads of which the most
important are the Erie and the Nev; York Chicago & St. Louis,
but is in the position of having its own securities held by
various members of the group notaoly Chesapeake Corp. , which
ovms some 2,359,000 shares or 30.8,'!^ of Chesapeake & Ohio
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common and 60,490 shares, or 39,5% of the preferred.
Under the Van Sweringen control the road was built into
one of the finest physical plants of its kind in the country.
Following the death of 0,P.Van Sv/eringen late in 1936, con-
trol passed to a f^roup of New York capitalists who hi ve "backed
the existing operating management.
Capitalization
mile funded debt of ^^239,602,000 comprises 5^,4^ of cap-
italization and is outstanding at $73,557 per mile of road and
appears to be large when compared with the Indus trjr as a whole
and with Norfolk & Western its competitor, the high density
of traffic and the stable earning power somewhat lessen the
unfavorable implications.
Funded debt is followed by •;^15,315,000 hfo Preference
stock which was distributed to stockholders as a special
dividend in 1937, and approximately 7,657,674 shares of common
with a par value of v?25 which makes a total capitalization
of approximately fp446,359, 150.
Traffic
The Chesapeake & Ohio's traffic is chiefly bituminous
coal which lar-^-.ely originates on the company's line. This
one item accoLints for a .proximately 82;^ of total tonnage and
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more than 75f/^ of the total freight revenues in normal times.
The relr?.tive importance of the various freight items can
be seen by referring to the following table.
Year Pass
.
Bitum,
Coal
Refined
Pete. Oils
Iron &
Steel
1932
1933
;934
1935
1936
2,73^
2,41
2.65
2.46
2.50
73.22^
72,94
71.43
70.60
70.84
1.30;^
1.07
1.14
1,20
1.08
0.93/^
1.21
1.44
1.77
1.96
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 280.
Little need be said about the Company's traffic other
than - bituminous is all important.
Earnings
Chesapeake's growth of earnings up to 1929 csn be attri-
buted to a pronounced swing in bituminous production totals
away from the Pennsylvania fields to the V/est Virginia fields
through which the Company's lines hold sway, because of lower
production costs. In the period of 1920-1929 West Virginia
production rose from 16^ of the country's total to 26%,
This swing continued even further into 1933, the proportion
rising to 28^, allov.-ing Chesapeake & Ohio to show a lesser
decline in gross revenues after 1929 than was the case with
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most roads. The per cent decline from 1929 to 1933 was
29,6/a versus a decline of 50.7^ in gross revenues for the
railroad industr;/ as a whole.
The following table shows the splendid earnings record
of the Chesapeake & Ohio.
Avail, for Fixoa Times
Year Fixed Chp;s. Charp;ei3 Earned
1921 114,103,293 $9,793,361 1.44
1922 • 16,800,621 10,159,011 1.65
1923 21,230,253 12,131,203 1,75
1924 23,679,526 11,457,483 •2.07
1925 31,418,088 11,265,819 2.70
1926 39,324,423 10,029,621 3.92
1927 38,327,263 9,719,948 3.94
1928 38,872,543 9,955,618 3.90
1929 41,285,758 9,900,342 4.54
1930 44,800,853 10,667,913 4.20
1931 37,470,774 10,774,291 3.48
1932 34,183,151 10,655,396 3.21
1933 38,532,496 10,292,686 3.74
1934 37,905,567 9,843,164 3.85
1935 40,805,317 9,765,832 4.18
1936 54,052,874 10,262,871 5.27
Source
:
Mundy ' s "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 282.
The Company has always been able to meet fixed charges
and from the date of organization to January 1, 1937 98
cash dividends amounting to approximately ^252,234,000 have
been paid. The present dividend is at the rate of #3.00
annually.
As can readily be seen by an analysis of the Company's
traffic, earnings will vary with the amount of bituminous
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coal consumed. In the past the road has been very success-
ful in maintaining its position throughout periods of bus-
iness depression, and its fine depression record he?.:: made
any skimping of maintenance expenditures unnecessary. As a
result th3 road is in excellent condition and earnings are
freely handed over to the common stockholders.
Near Term Outlook
Although the present business recession has es-ten
measurably into the earnings of the Chesapeake & Ohio a size-
able net income is still being reported giving evidence of
the road's already proven ability to weather economic storms
with flying colors. Although earnings for the first part of
1938 will no doubt be below those of last year , they v/ill,
nevertheless, be sizeable.
The Chesapeake & Ohio's current financial por^ition is con
siderably stronger than that of most roads. On November 30,
1937 current assets, including ^}38 ,980, 23-^ cash, amounted to
^54,272,564 and vjere more than twice current liabilities of
125,332,987. I'jear-term maturities amount to only '^2,848,000
and -vhile sufficiently large to throw a good many roads into
financial difficulties, they will be met by the C&O v/ithout
the slightest difficulty. The road's near-term position can
be declared with positive assurance, exceptionally strong.
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Longer Term Outlook
The fairly conservative capitalization of the Ches-
apeake & Ohio coupled with its splendid earnings record
throughout the depression seem to indicate that the road's
position is secure. This conclusion would most heartly be
sustained "by most analysts who have given the road's setup
any serious consideration. The Chesapeake & Ohio has de-
monstrated its ability, undar the worst depression influences,
to maintain earnings at a level in excess of |3 a common
share.
A plan has been proposed and conditionally approved
by the ICC whereby the Chesapeake & Ohio would gain direct
control of the Erie Railroad Co. a.nd of the New York Chi-
cago & St. Louis and establish a unified system. This step
would facilitate the building up of one of the country's
major integrated rail transportation systems. And it would
provide for direct one-road handling of important coal traffic
from producing fields to major consuming areas in eastern
sections. Through coordination of services offered by indi-
vidual roads the consolidated carrier could effect fairly
large savings in operating expenses. Although the Erie is
at the present time being reorganized under section 77 there
is considerable belief that the Chesapeake & Ohio will acquire
control of the road as soon as Erie will cut capitalization
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dov/n to a supportable size where it can operate as a profit-
able road. At present capitalized levels the New York Chi-
cago & St. Louis would be a liability if assumed by the Ches-
apeake & Ohio. However, the astute management of the C&O
will not be induced to assume any over-capitalized road and
if the plan is ever consuraated the C&O will see to it that
the system as a whole wiUbe soundly capitalized and a strong
unit
.
Whether the above plan is eventuated oi- not, the Che-
sapec-.ke & Ohio will continue to operate profitably .for a good
many years to come. Its long-term earnings trend, however,
will be governed by the rate which competitive fuels can make
inroads upon bituminous coal. It is not likely that any
sudden change in fuel habits will take pi. ce, however, it is
the Chesapeake & Ohio's most vulnera.ble point; and there is
evidence that bituminous coa.1 is suffering a decline in use
similar to that effecting anthracite, although to a lesser
degree.
Investment Status
The splendid record of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co. over the past twenty years entitles its securities to
the highest rating accorded rail securities. Its proven record
and excellent dividend payments place it amongst the foremost
roads of the country. The single adverse factor, a heavy de-
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pendence upon bituminous traffic is not of sufficient import-
ance to warrant attention at this time. However, it should
be kept in mind that the volume of bituminous traffic is de-
clining and that this factor may at some later date have the
power to drag the road from its present secure position.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Rat inp; Hip:h Low
Chesapeake & Ohio Ref. Imp. 3is 1996 103 93
A** Chesapeake & Ohio (Potts Cr. Br.) 4s 1946 111 106
A** Chesapeake & Ohio (Rich & A. ) 1st 4s 1989 120 108
A^Hfr Chesapeake & Ohio 1st C 5s 1939 109 105
A^ Chesapeake & Ohio $4 Preferred 100 89
A Chesapeake & Ohio Common 69 31
The above table clearly shows the high investment cal-
ibre of the Chesapeake & Ohio's obligations. The marked sta-
bility of the 1937 price rsnge, a hectic year for rail bonds,
is an example of investors faith in the ability of this road
to weather almost any difficulty.
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DSLAWARS AND HUDSON CO.
On April 1, 1930 the Delaware & Hudson Co. in an attempt
to segregate transportation properties from its coal proper-
ties, transferred virtually all its important railroad inter-
ests to a new company known as the Delaware & Hudson Railroad
Corp. The Delaware & Hudson Co. transferred to the new corp.
its operations as a common carrier, but retained, in addition
to its interest in the anthracite industry, namely the Delav/are
& Hudson Coal Co., the operation of street, suburban and inter-
urban railroads not operated as part of the steam system, the
railroads located in the Province of Quebec and those now
under lease to the New York, Ontario & Western Ry.
For the properties, the new railroad corporation paid to
the Delaware & Hudson Co. 19,000,000 in cash and 515,7^0 shares
of no par common stock. This is the only class of stock out-
standing and is the full amount authorized. The Delav/are &
Hudson Railroad Corp, assumed the funded debt of the Delaware
& Hudson Co. which amounted to |69,500,000 on December 31,
1936. This funded debt, which was assumed, still remains a
contingent liability of the Delaware & Hudson Co.
The railroad system established by the Delav/are & Hudson
Co. and transferred to the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp.
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in 1930 is the oldest in the country. It began as a canal
company and was designed to distribute coal from associated
Pennsylvania anthracite mines, among the richest in the
country. Not until 1909 did it accept the functions of a
common carrier. The system forms a bridge line between
Montreal and New England and between Pennsylvania and New
England, v/ith connections at Schenectady, and Albany, Nev;
York, with a number of other railroads including the Penn-
sylvania, Reading, Lehigh Valley, -i^rie and the Boston &
Maine
.
Capitalization
The Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. has outstanding
5]_5^Y2fo shares of common stock all ovmei by the Delaware
& Hudson Co., and #69,500,000 in funded debt. The disad-
vantage of the railroad's funded debt which is outstanding
at a relatively high rate per mile of road, is partially
offset because the Delaware & Hudson Co. has a contingent
liability in regard to the Railroad Corp's debt. Fortu-
nately there are no neer-term debts of any consequence. In
1940 .>^1,000,000 Adirondack Railway 1st 4-|-s fall due and in
the next year |49,000,000 Ist and refunding 4s mature. The
funded debt of the Railroad Corp. has been serviced through-
out the depression. An initial dividend of ^1 was paid to
the Delaware & Hudson Co. on December 31, 1931 and nothing

92
has' bean paid since that date.
The sole capitalization of the Delaware & Hudson Co.
is 514,433 shares of comirion stock par ^^100 on which large
dividends were paid until recent years.
Traffic
The Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp. is essentially an
anthracite carrier. In 1936 as the following table reveals,
32,35% of operating revenue was received from the transpor-
tation of anthracite coal and 11. 12;"^ from bituminous.
Year
Products
of Agri.
Animals
& Prods
Products
of Mines
Products
of Forests
Mfrs.
& Misc.
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
4.61^
4.14
4.02
4.12
4.11
2,20,^
2.45
2.23
2.10
1.93
50.06^
49.84
52.74
50.53
51.01
2.67/^
2.97
2.62
3.23
2.74
22.28/^
24.37
24.43
26.45
27.96
Year Pass. Anth. Coal Bitum. Coal *^Paper
1932 5.99.^ 37.33^ 8.65^ 4.30^
1933 5.01 35.38 9.63 4.74
1934 4.90 37.23 10.57 4.92
1935 4.61 34.55 10.54 4.98
1936 4.57 32.35 11.12 5.10
Includes newsprint paper and printing paper
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 36O.
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In 1936 manufactures & miscellaneous amounted to only
27,96% of total operating revenue, products of forests 2,7^%,
products of agriculture 4,ll;Tb, while products of mines com-
prised more than 51% of total operating revenues.
Earnings
For years the road was a high and stable esmer, but
with changing conditions in the 1920 's, accentuated by the
depression, earning power of the formerly prosperous coal-
railroad combination evaporated.
As the following table reveals, the do;vnward trend in
the Delaware & Hudson's traffic was merely accelerated by
the depression.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs. Charg;es Earned
1921 $10,173,950 15,236,498 1.94
1922 4,861,871 5,337,871 0.91
1923 10,198,837 5,487,138 1.86
1924 11,716,755 5,493,505 2.13
1925 10,927,166 5,692,190 1.92
1926 14,133,510 5,830,233 2.42
1927 8,698,599 5,626,738 1.55
1928 11,346,002 4,961,773 2.29
1929 12,578,187 4,769,473 2.64
1930 10,274,086 4,632,367 2.22
1931 7,703,946 4,460,916 1.73
1932 3,409,778 4,578,541 0.74
1933 3,265,624 -"^5,150,258 0.63
1934 3,542,392 , •:^5, 180,419 0.68
1935 2,582,991 •^'4,467,174 0.58
1936 4,333,981 ^^4, 398, 137 0.99
*Including interest on non-ne^^otiable debt.
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 36I.
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The road is essentially an anthracite carrier and in-
roads were steadily being made upon anthracite markets even
before the depression set in. The record of earnings recovery
in the early period of business improvement from depression
low levels has been poor and apparently will continue so.
The value of the railroad property as based upon earning
power is intrinsically less than the debt outstanding against
it.
Although earnings were not satisfactory during the de-
pression, a rapid improvement was evidenced in 1936 by both
the rail and coal properties. The Hudson Coal netted if335,-
000 versus a #666,000 loss in 1935, while the Delavtrare &
Hudson Railroad Corp. lost only -^927,000 versus #2,775,000
in 1935. Although at this v^riting, year-end statements have
not been issued it is definitely known that the coal sub-
sidiary experienced reduced earnings in 1937 and that the
rail subsidiary may break even.
In the final analysis the strength, such as it is,
of the Delaware & Hudson Co. lies in its investment port-
folio, and particularly in its large holdings of New York
Central common stock.
The Delav/are & Hudson Co. has always been able to
service its funded debt (now held by the Railroad Corp.)
without any difficulties and, until recently had maintained
dividends on the common at a very generous rate. In fact
1
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^9 a share was paid from 1907 to 1931 when the dividend was
cut to ^1.50 in 1932 and nothing has been paid since that
date, i'Tom the date of its organization to December, 31,
1936 the Company declared a total of 290 cash dividends,
aggregating 828 | per cent or ^187,129,887 not to mention
numerous stock dividends.
Near Term Outlook
Although the Delaware & Hudson's rail-coal properties
have scored material improvement since the depression depths,
basic dependence upon anthracite precludes impressive earn-
ings recovery.
The management, under the clever Chairman L. F. Loree,
has turned its attention to other investments v/ith con-
siderable success, and has lined the treasury with huge profits
from stock market operations in railroad shares, conducted
in an effort to place the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corp,
at the head of a proposed new Eastern Trunk Line System,
These ambitions ha,ve not been realized but meanwhile the
Company's treasury owns a valuable list of marketa.ble se-
curities, including 495,000 shares of the capital stock of
the New York Central, Income from this source over the
near-term is unlikely owing to the difficulties now being
experienced by the New York Central as a result of the re-
cession in heavy industry activity and the tremendous increase
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in operating expenses. It is very likely, therefore, that
earnings of the Delaware a: Hudson Co. will not be seen over
the near-term.
On December 31, 1936 the current assets of the Delaware
& Hudson Railroad Corp, were 96, 321,141, including #2,400,-
231 material and supplies, and -)2, 194,157 cash; current
liabilities amounted to $4, 589, 358, On the same date, Dec-
ember 31, 1936, the Delaware and Hudson Co, had total assets
of ^121,315,331, consisting principally of ^46,953,097
marketable stocks and bonds at cost, and #73,043,237 invest-
ments in and advances and loans to affiliated companies.
Liabilities consisted principally of capital stock and surplus
and in addition bank loans of ^7,862,000,
Although the Delaware & Hudson may not experience dif-
ficulties during the next few years i u , nevertheless, occupies
a vulnerable position.
Longer Term Outlook
The Delaware & Hudson Co, as well as the Dealware & Hudson
Railroad Corp. are chiefly dependent upon anthracite for
earnings.
The histor:^ of the anthracite industry for the last two
decades does not carry favorable implications for the future.
The industry has lost markets because bitter strikes have
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tied up production in Winter months and because competitive
fuels, principally gas and oil, have made determined bids
for the limited house heating narket v/hich the anthracite
producers once regarded as their o'vvn private domain.
A glance at the statistics covering anthracite pro-
duction is illuminating: the 1921 production of 90 million
tons of anthracite declined to 5'^ million tons in 1922, a
strike year, rose to 93 million tons in 1923 and gradually
declined to 73 million tons in 1929. Depression influences
accentuated this trend so that in 1953, production- reached
the record low point of 49 million tons. There has been a
very limited recover- y from the low levels of .production,
with 1936 output approximating 5^ million tons.
There appears to be little hope that lower wage costs
will aid the anthracite producers in their battle for exis-
tence; in fact, the trend appears to be in a reverse dir-
ection. As far as the Delaware & Hudson is concerned the
road is relatively poor financially, as are most anthracite
carriers, and lov/er tariffs for hauling anthracite hardly
appear Justified.
All things taken into consideration, it appears that
the future of the anthracite industry is exceedingly drab
and that competitive fuels v/ill succeed in capturing a large
portion of the market which the e-nthracite industry pre-
viously enjoyed.
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With the entire railroad industry faced by the problem
of higher operating costs, the anthracite-carri,lng roads
appear to be in a very poor position in that expansion of
anthracite traffic seems unlikely. The ICC decision, in
the latter part of 1937, refusing higher rates on anthra-
cite, while granting most of the freight increases requested,
must be taken as an indication that the ICC did not believe
that the anthracite industry could bear additional freight
rates, and that higher ts,riffs would merely result in de-
creasing the a.nthracite tonnage moved. The decision may
be said to bring into bold relief the plight of the in-
dustry and the carriers serving it. In view of the above
the Delaware & Hudson Co. and Railroad Corp. do not face
a favorable future.
Investment Status
The steady downward trend of anthracite traffic which
is so vitally important to the Delaware & Hudson's well being
spells lower earnings in years to come. The road's already
weakened position vdll not be able to withstand any sizeable
shrinkage in revenues. The large invest^nents of the Delaware
& Hudson So., chiefly New York Central stock, will not be
able to ward off a financial crisis, for any length of time,
which now appears inevitable.
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. The market movement of the securitie" of the Delaware
& Hudson Railroad Corp. reveals plainly the speculative
nature of the situation. The steady drop in anthracite
traffic, with the resultant decline in earnings, coupled
with the road's heavy capitalization, forecast receivership
sometime in the not too distant future.
Under no circumstances could the ahove securities lay
claim to any investment merit. They are obligations of a
Company catering to a declining industry anl although in-
terest on the bonds is still being paid eventual default
appears certain.
Poor's
Rat inp;
Price Range
1937
Hiph Low
B^* Adirondack Railway Co. 1st 4-g-s 19'^2
B^^ De lav/are & Hudson 1st Ref. 4s 19^3
C'=-' Delaware & Hudson Common stock
99
95
58
90
13
1
100
ILLINOIS CENTRxlL RAILROAD CO
.
With 6,575 miles of main line, the Illinois Central
system comprises the largest north south railroad in the
Middle West, providing the shortest route from Chicago to
the G-ulf of Mexico. The road has a perfect network of lines
extending do\m the eastern side of the Mississippi, through
Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee and ijlississippi , thereby
serving the rich Mississippi Valley basin for practically
its entire course. Lines extend northwestward and westward
into Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, and to the transcon-
tinental gateways at Omah Nebraska and the Twin Cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul,
On the East, steme branch out to Indianapolis, Louis-
ville and Birmingham and through the controlled Central
Railway of Georgia, now in receivership, the lines reach the
Atlantic Seaboard at oavannah.
At its termini in Chicago and New Orleans, the road
has a strong position, particularly in the former city v/here
it ovms twenty-six city blocks near the "Loop" district.
Capitalization
With funded debt of ^370,106,000 representing 70,6;^ of
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total capitalization or nearly
-1^57 »000 a mile, the Illinois
Central occupies a vulnerable position. i'he large funded
debt coupled with jflS, 645,700 non-cumulative 6% preferred
stock provides sizeable leverage for the 1,358,000 common
shares when earnings are sufficient to cover fixed charges
1.50 times or more, but when earnings are poor the top-
heavy capitalization causes sizeable deficits.
Traffic
Covering such a v/ide expanse of territory, it is natural
that the traffic of the Illinois Central should be of a di-
verse nature. As shown by the following table, in the years
from 1932 to 1936 products of agriculture provided sli.ghtly
more than 19% of total freight revenues. Products of mines
contributed about 22%, with bituminous coal the leading re-
venue producing commodity through its contribution of around
2JI% of the road's total freight revenues. Products of animals
contributed about 6%, products of forests about S% and manu-
factures and miscellaneous products about 26%,
Year
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
Products
of A/3;ri.
20.57^
19.79
19.86
18.58
18.39
Animals
& Prods
5.94;^
6.36
6.91
5.27
5.20
Products
of Mines
24.80^
21.38
21.33
21.99
20.74
Products
of Forests
5.69%
6.79
6.81
8.63
9.18
Mfrs.
& Misc
.
21.71^
23.70
26.32
28.78
29.23
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 425.
1I
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Leading revenue commodities in the order of their im-
portance are: bituminous coal, bananas, lumber, shingles,
petroleum products, cotton, grain, fresh meats and packing
house products, automobiles, vegetables, iron and steel and
a variety of manufacturers. The nature of the road's traffic
renders it particularly vulnerable to highway competition.
In addition, competition from government subsidized shipping
on the Mississippi must be faced.
A study of the freight traffic of the Illinois Central
reveals a dangerously weak situation. In 1927 the' road
carried 63,301,448 tons of freight and its freight traffic
density - the nujnber of tons of freight carried one mile
per mile of road operated - which is one of the best means
of deternining the health of a railroad v/as 2,441,939.
At the bottom of the depression 32,965,66? tons of freight
were handled and the tonnage density was 1,157,692. In 1936
the corresponding figures were 44,843,897 tons and 1,615,-
056 respectively.
From the 1927 peak, tonnage declined 47.9^ and traffic
density 52.6;.s to the 1933 lov/ from which recoveries of 36%
and 39.5/b had been accomplished by the end of 1936. Compared
with 1927, however, 1936 tonnage was still off 29.2^ and
traffic density was 33.9/^ under the earlier year's level.
It is rather apparent from a comparison of the fore-
going figures and the general business level obtaining in
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1927 and 1936 - the Federal Reserve Board Index of industrial
production stood at 106% of the 1923-25 average for the former
year and at 105,^ for the latter year - that something is making
serious inroads into the Illinois Central's traffic; the com-
petitors are the highway and the water carriers.
To a greater extent than perhaps any other major rail-
road the Illinois Central is the victim of unregulated or
subsidized competition. Its main line parallels the Miss-
issippi from Cairo south and its territory generally is
exactly the same as that in which inland waterway .carriers
are active operators.
The importance of this is that the water carriers are
carriers of largely bulky goods, A study of the Illinois
Central's traffic reveals that the major portion is of bulk
goods. In addition to this the road has had to face the
usual competition of private autoraobiles and buses as pass-
enger carriers and trucks as short haul carriers of high
revenue freight. The rusult has been to malce the Illinois
Central a high speed road - overnight package freight service
Chicago to Memphis is just one example - but speed means
expense.
To round out its woes the Illinois Central has seen
its export traffic dwindle with the stagnation in world
trade and shrinking markets for American cotton and receipts
from western connections have suffered from the recent years
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of drought in the Southwest especially and from the entire
West. In the circumstances it is not to be wondered that
earning power has shrunk.
Earnings
Unquestionably the earning power of the Illinois
Central has been seriously impaired. Reduced maintenance
restricted depression losses, but the unusual degree of
leverage tended to exaggerc.te changes in share earnings. In
a]l probability , much of the carrier's cotton trade for export
has been permanently lost, while there is little prospect
for relief from highway and waterway competition. In fact
the situation has caused the road to operate fast freights
which are very costly.
Net
Year Income
1922 |16,090,0C0
1923 15,485,000
1924 16 , 249 , 000
1925 17,552,000
1926 17,150,000
1927 12,132,000
1928 13,250,000
1929 13,520,000
1930 9,290,000
1931 *3, 582,000
1932 *3, 506,000
1933 158,000
1934 *2, 965, 000
1935 *9, 932, 000
1936 765,000
*Def icit
Earnings Common
Per Share Dividends
1^14.29 §7.00
13.55 7.00
12.39 7.00
12.86 7.00
12.06 7.00
8.14 7.00
8.94 7.00
9.14 7.00
6.02 7.00
^"^.41 3.50
-3.40 0.00
-5^0.71 0.00
^3.01 0.00
*8.07 0.00
*^0.19 0.00

105
As can readily be seen by the above table earnings
rapidly disappeared during? the depression anil have not im-
proved during the last two years to the same extent as has
business in general. This is chiefly due, as has been point-
ed out before, to competition from highway and v/ater carriers.
Near Term Outlook
As a result of improved agricultural conditions in the
territory served and a high level of activity in the heavy
industries, until late in 1937, the Illinois Central should
cover fixed charges for the full year. However, acute com-
petition has so pressed the road that continuation of the
current industrial recession promises to render 1938 oper-
ations unprofitable.
The only maturities which the road has during 1938 are
equipment trust issues which for the full year will aggregate
around $6,877,000. It is likely that these maturities will
be met either by RFC loans or help from other Governmental
agencies. The road is imable to borrow through banking
sources any of the funds required to pay the maturity in as
much as its principal collateral is now pledged with the
Government agencies.
Current financial position is relatively weak and the
road must rely upon outside aid to carry it over the inter-
mediate term.
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Longer Term Outlook
With so large a proportion of its mileage in the South
where prospects for Increased traffic are not so convincing
as they are in the Eastern and Central regions, Illinois
Central faces the prospect of supporting capitalization in
a mediocre manner. The road's traffic is vulnerable to
competition from other carriers even more so than most roads.
Earnings improvement since the depression has not been satis-
factory and the prospects of any substantial impro.vement is
very unlikely. The road's top-heavy capitalization precludes
any improvement in earnings over the long-term. The rate
increas3S recently granted and those expected in March 1938
will not be sufficient to enable the road to adequately
support its capitalization. Even in the prosperous year 1929
the railroad covered its fixed charges only 1.72 times.
Coupled v/ith its large capitalization the Illinois
Central owes the RFC a total of ';?35, 195,000 and the PWA an
additional ^7,750,000. Although the roads operating effi-
ciency is fairly high relative to its territory, considerable
sums should be spent on maintenance.
Unquestionably the road's position has been impaired
and it is very doubtful v/hether the road will be able to
support its capitalization on future earnings. Competition
from subsidized river boats and from trucks has taken the
I
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most valuable traffic and any increase in rates would no
doubt deprive the road of still more traffic.
The Illinois Central has Just about reached its
borrov/ing capacity. All available collateral has been tied
up in RFC loans and the banks are unwilling to lend the road
additional money. Capitalization is too heavy and almost
insupport^.ble , It is doubtful if the Illinois Central
could weather another depression and it is very probable
that the road's capitalization will h.ve to be materially
reduced within the next five years, barring some unforseen
development.
Investment Status
The Illinois Central has anything but a satisfactory
outlook. in fact, it is not particularly rash to say that
the road will be in financial trouble in the event of anothe:
depression or a prolonged slump in business. In viev/ of
the Illinois Central's declining position, none of its
securities are worthy of consideration for investment pur-
poses* -i^h® violent fluctuations in the market levels of
its securities ably show the speculative position which
they hold.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Rat ing Hip;h Low
A Illinois Central 1st 4s 1951 111 97
i
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Price Range
Poor's 1937
Ratlnp; Hlp;h Low
A Illinois Central 1st 3^s, 1951 108 93
A Illinois Central 3s 1951 107 96
A Illinois Central (Cairo Bridge) 4s 1950 80 32
B^>- Illinois Central Refunding 5s 1955 90 4l
B* Illinois Central Refunding 4s 1955 95 51
B* Illinois Central Purchased Lines 3-|s 1952 96 4-5
Illinois Central Collateral Trust 4s 1953 90 49
3 Illinois Central 4 3/4s 1966 105 56
C Illinois Central 6% non-cum. Conv. Preferred 68 16
Illinois Central Common Stock 38 8
With the long-term outlook for the roa:i decidedly un-
an account.
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LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO .
The Louisville & Nashville, controlled by the Atlantic
Coast Line embraces 5,009 miles, principally in Kentucky,
Tennessee and Alabama v/ith the northern portion centering
at Louisville from where lines lead west to St. Louis and
east to Cincinnati and the Kentucky bituminous fields.
Southern routes of the road terminate at Nashville, Memphis,
Birmingham, Montgomery and the Gulf at Pensacola and New
Orleans.
The Louisville & Nashville operates into Chicago over
the Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway - the u'ionon
line - which it controls jointly with the Southern Railway.
The Monon has been operating under the provisions of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act since the start of 193-^.
The road is one of the important coal carriers of the
country, its lines tapping the fields of Kentucky, Alabama,
western Virginia and eastern Tennessee, for movement into
the Chicac^o, Toledo and Detroit markets. The road is a
leading transporter of freight through the ports of Mobile,
New Orleans and Pensacola.
It is in direct competition with the Illinois Central
Railroad for traffic between Lake Michigan and the Gul and
is the principal competitor of the Southern Railway between
Cincinnati and New Orles,ns,
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Capitalization
Although the ratio of debt to total capitalization is
quite high, slightly more than 65J^> "the debt capitalization
of 122,642,530 is slightly less than |45,000 per mile of road
and is not excessive. The management has been farsighted
and has substituted 3^% bonds to take the place of a portion
of the 5% and 6% issues. The 1,170,000 shares of common
stock, par v^-lue ^100, comprise the remaining 35% of the
capitalization and possess a fair degree of leverage.
On December 31> 1936 the Atlantic Coast Line owned 596,700
shares or 51^ of the capital stock. On the whole the capital
structure of the Louisville & Nashville can be classified as
satisfactory.
Traffic
As can readily be seen by refeirirg to the following tables
the road is primarily dependent upon bituminous traffic for
its revenue. In 1936 39.23^ of total operating revenue was
produced by this traffic and 7.24^ by passenger traffic,
2,31% from refined petroleum oils and 3.41,^ from lumber
shingles and laths. Products of mines produce 49^j of total
revenues and manufactures and miscellaneous approximately
15% in normal times.
I
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Products Animals Products Mfrs.
Year of Ap;ri. & Prods. of Mines & Misc.
1932 10.44^ 2.36^ 4l.6l^ 18.04
1933 9.97 2.41 42.92 19.05
1934 9.85 2.78 41.53 20.45
1935 8.00 2.19 43.54 20.79
1936 7.61 1.84 46.05 20.93
Lumber
Year Pass.
Bitum.
Coal
Refined
Pete. Oils
Shingles
.& Lath
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
8.10%
6.90
7.58
7.63
7.24
36.01%
36.81
35.31
37.37
39.23
4.89/^
4.39
4.29
3.79
2.81
2.92%
3.29
2.62
3.19
3.41
Source
:
Mundy '
s
"Earning Power of Railroads" Page 467.
The road handles important agricultural traffic, as
well as appreciable quantities of petroleum products, iron
and steel, lumber and fertilizer. Passenger traffic is
less importrint to Louisville & Nashville than to most
Southern roads.
Earnings
From the 1929 peak earnings diminished steadily until
they reached the vanishing point in 1932, when a net loss of
|2, 108,875 was incurred - the road's only i-inprofitable year
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of the depression. Earnings recovered rapidly from the
depression lows and in 1936 the Louisville & Nashville
reported fixed charge coverage of 1.92 times and per
share earnings of -^8.^2, Despite extensive flood damage
and the loss of rate surcharges, early 1937 earnings were
again higher. However , the August and October v/age boosts
increased costs while the sudden slump in heavy industry
activity caused freight tonnage to decline sharply. As a
result the year 1937 is expected to net approximately ^6.50
per share.
Dividends on the common have been paid with few ex-
ceptions in every year since 1864. Although a dividend was
not paid in 1933, the previous omission was as far back as
1898, dividends were resumed with a #3.00 payment in 1934
which was increased to fll6.00 in 1936 and 1937. The following
table clearly shows the excellent record of the Louisville
& Nashville,
Year
Avail, for
Fixed Ch,g.s
.
Fixed
Char.g.es
Times
Earned
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
18,534,361
19,450,012
21,649,610
25,164,400
30,102,519
30,764,434
27,901,094
25,406,846
24,787,273
17,681,653
#8,936,247
•9,772,264
10,032,988
11,031,606
11,401,808
11,342,323
11,175,663
11,085,626
11,060,730
11,075,571
0.96
1,99
2,16
2,28
2,64
2,71
2.50
2,29
2,24
1.60
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Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed ChRS, Charp;es Earned
1931 :|11,843,511 110,803,565 1.10
1932 . 8,642,410 . 10,851,285 0.80
1933 12,431,276 10,635,560 1.17
1934 13,461,746 10,494,361 1.28
1935 14,444,028 10,315,085 1.40
1936 20,052,235 10,423,763 1.92
Source
:
Mimdy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 468.
The operating efficiency of the Louisville & Nashville
has been above the average for Southern railroads.- In fact
since 1932, the operating ratio has been below the 79.2^ of
1929, and in 1936 was 72. 1^^, the lowest since 1917. The
properties have been maintained in a very satisfactory
manner and maintenance charges together with depreciation
expenses have been adequate.
Near Term Outlook
The Louisville & Nashville has no loans from the
Government and its current working capital position is very
strong. On November 31, 1937 current assets, including
cash of 414,927,892, amounted to ^^33, 977, 224, and were more
than three times the current liabilities of #10,302,460.
Only |420,00 in funded debt is due within six months and
there are no near term maturities - recent maturities were
refinanced at lower rates of interest a few years ago.
1
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Without question the road is in excellent shape and
should have no financial difficulties for a good many years.
Longer Term Outlook
The ability of the road to weather the depression v/ith
flying colors is evidence of its strength and satisfactory
financial position. Maintenance charges have alv/ays been
adequate and the property is in excellent shape. Although
the current recession is temporarily cutting into 'earnings
they are, nevertheless, still adequate and quite substantial.
The only flaw in the long-term picture is the road's
dependence upon bituminous coal for revenue. The demand for
bituminous coal has been decreasing for a good many years.
Its customers are gradually using other fuels. Although the
decline is not in anyway threatening at the present time
its effects are, nevertheless, noticeable. However, even
though earnings gains over a long span of years may be re-
stricted by inroads which natural gas, oil and other com-
peting fuels ara making upon markets for coal the Louisville
5; Nashville should be able to make at least moderate progress
during any period featured by normal business. The road's
strong physical character and sound financial position guaran
ty it a secure place amongst railroads for a good many years
to come.
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Investment Status
Notwithstanding the drop in ec.mings from 1926 to 1932
and the road's dependence upon bituminous traffic, its position
condition and outlook are satisfactory. The strength and
character of the railroad are reflected in its outstanding
dividend record and earnings. The Louisville ic Nashville
bonds although not of the highest grade are suitable for most
accounts
.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Rat in/3; Low
A** Louisville & Nashville (St. L. ) 3s 1980 96 85
Louisville & Nashville Unif. 4s 1940 109 103
Louisville & Nashville (Pad. & M. ) 1st 4s '40 112 105
Louisville & Nashville 1st & Ref. 3fs 2003 98 79
A* Louisville & Nashville 1st & Ref. 4& 2003 104 85
A* Louisville & Nashville 1st & Ref. 4is 2003 109 92
A^ Louisville & Nashville 1st & Ref. 5s 2003 111 98
Louisville & Nashville Common Stock 99 48
The top bonds of the Louisville & Nashville railroad
such as the St, Louis Division 3s 1980, the Unified 4s 1940
and the Paducah & Memphis Division 1st 4s 1946 are suitable
for the most conservative accounts. The 1st & Refunding
Issues, however, are subject to market fluctuations and
cannot be considered satisfactory for those desiring stability
of principal. The common stock is only a speculation.
II
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NSW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD CO
.
Operating some 26,000 miles of road, the New York
Central System stands second only to the Pennsylvania in
Eastern Trunk Line territory. First track owned, leased
and otherwise operated totals approximately 11,500 miles.
The Company dominates New York State and is strongly en-
trenched in the Great Lakes Section, It also has a direct
entrance into New England through the Boston & Albany RR,
Its lines cover the most highly industrialized and populous
sections of the country. Its main line from Nev/ York to
Chicago, the famed "water level" route taps the major in-
dustrial centers of the East and Middle West. A community
of interest with western roads with which connections are
made at St, Louis, gives the Central a strong grasp on a
good volume of transcontinental traffic.
Capitalization
As of December 31, 1936, the 1981,892,000 funded debt
on a system basis, comprised 6l,3^ of total capitalization,
including ^21, 338, 000 serially payable to the State of New
York for elimination of grade crossings.
In 1934 stockholders subscribed for virtually all of a
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|59f900,000 collateral trust bond issue sold in that year and
when the conversion privilege changed from hp-^O to <|50 a share
on May 10, 1937, 97/^ of the bonds were converted. This im-
proved the Company's capital set up, but increased the out-
standing coaimon by 1,455,000 or 29%, In 1937 all govern-
ment advances were paid prior to maturity and floating debt
was eliminated. Outstanding equipment trust certificates
were cut down to ^33,822,000 as of December 31,1936 from
$40,736,000 a year earlier; Reconstruction Finance Corp.
and PWA loans of #15,84-9,000 were paid and loans and bills
payable including bank and demand loans classed as funded
debt were reduced to ^198,440 from #65,300,763 while out-
standing convertible secured bonds and other secured bonds and
notes increased to #122,510,600 from #59,911,100.
Although considerable improvement ha::: been made in re-
cent years by the Central's financing program the road is
still burdened by a heavy funded debt. However, the amount
outstanding pei^ mile of road is not unreasonable especially
when considering the compact nature of the territory which
the system serves. Debt has been serviced throughout the
depression, with trie help, however, of substantial Qoans
,
During the next fifteen years, more than #250,000,000
in long-term debt matures. The road, itself, has proposed
a plan for meeting the maturities by accumulating yearly
depreciation charges and applying them to debt retirements.
J
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Whether this is feasible or not remains to "be seen. It
certainly raises the question as to how the road would fi-
nance property replacements.
Traffic
The territory served is densely populated and exceed-
ingly well developed economically. There is a good diver-
sification of manufactured and agricultural products to be
shipped and excellent markets in the many large industrial
cities, within reach of the Company's lines. Probably no
section of the country is so self-sustaining as the one
served by this system. Not unnatural, then, is it that
freight tonnage, v/hich consists largely of products of mines
principally soft and hard coal, and manufactured products
comprise the well-paying freight. Passenger business is
important as is reflected in the stable revenues from this
end compared with other roads. This may be attributed to
the great number of commuters that use the Company's lines.
As is shown by the following table passengers and bi-
tuminous coal were the most important revenue producers in
1936 with iron and steel, automobile and trucks next in
order of importance.
i
!
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Autos
,
Bitum, Iron & Refined Pass, & Anth.
Year Pass
.
Coal Steel Pete. Oils Trucks Coal
1932 20,49^ 15.85^ 2.09^ 3.15% 1.53% 1.85,^
1933 18.79 17.22 2.93 2.92 2.78 1.76
1934 18.55 17.28 3.27 2.63 3.82 1.96
1935 17.83 17.42 4.33 2.35 4.86 1.83
1936 17.33 17.22 5.25 2.07 4.87 1.72
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 526.
Passenger revenues in 1929 constituted nearly 25% of
the total, but by 1933 had dwindled to less than 20%,
Passenger business during recent years has probably been
Central's largest liability but developments since 1936
have been encouraging. Streamline trains have been in-
stalled on an experimental basis, new equipment purchased
and time schedules lowered.
New York Central's earnings during the prosperous 20 's
ranged between c^S.Ol and$l6.91 a share with fixed charges
covered more than twice. However, earnings were quick to
disappear with the advent of the depression. Fixed charge
coverage drop oed from 2.33 times in 1929 to 0,70 times in
1932 the low for the depression. Central's recovery in
earnings since 1932, has followed closely the trend of activ-
ity in the heavy industries and has been magnified in its
bearing upon the stock through the effect of leverage. It
was not until 1935 that fixed charges v/ere covered and then
only 1.00 times. Recovery in 1936 was more substantial and
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fixed charges were covered 1.16 times. It is estimated that
the coverage for 1937 will be lower than 1936. With the
present depression in heavy industry reaching substantial
proportions and with costs rising, lower earnings can scarce
be avoided over the near-term even should higher rates be
realized.
The Company owns valuable New York City real estate in
the G-rand Cen'Lral zone and has shrewdly utilized its "air
rights". Other investments include a majority interest in
Pittsburg & Lake Erie which gives the system its valuable
entrance into the Pittsburgh steel district, and substantial
holdings in the Reading & Rutland railroads. The Company
reported other income of #21,906,224 in 1936 received from
its large investment in affiliated companies.
An idea of the variableness of the Central's traffic
can be obtained by a study of the following table.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chgs. Charges Earned
1921 173,585,031 152,641,288 1.4o
1922 71,075,738 50,440,552 1.4l
1923 95,251,495 49,912,068 1.90
1924 88,324,973 49,074,573 1.80
1925 92,969,289 44,342,065 2.10
1926 100,756,028 45,091,987 2.23
1927 103,948,083 45,382,939 2.29
1928 94,787,111 44,452,626 2.13
1929 135,491,477 58,062,894 2.33
1930 94,438,866 58,457,075 1.62
i
I
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Avail, for Fixed Times
V.p To-n e^r\
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
$6 1,045, 160
41,716,693
54,206,763
51,972,729
58,486,391
66,074,725
158,615,059
59,973,093
59,619,277
59,655,064
58,371,345
57,141,550
1.04
0.70
0.91
0.87
1.00
1.16
Source
:
Mundy ' s "earning Power of Railroads" Page 528.
As the above table readily shows the earnings trend of
the road follows closely the activity in general business;
and is very vulnerable to a decline in steel activity and
manufacturing.
From 1915 to 1931 dividends on the common were paid in
each year and amounts ranged from a low of 45 paid from 1915
to 1922 to a high of <J8 paid from 1928 to 1930, after 1931
dividends have not been paid. Although the road has never
had difficulties in meeting interest payments the present
financial strain is a decided test of the road's ability to
weather difficult conditions.
Near Term Outlook
The current recession in business dating from August
1937 has placed a severe strain upon the New York Central and
coupled with the loss of surcharges and increased operating
expenses the road is having a difficult time. Current fi-
nance on November 30, 1937 appeared sufficiently strong to
)
iI
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enable the road to emerge successfully from its present
predicament. Current assets, including cash of -i?17, 593,728,
amounted to i?7^, 109,304 and compared with current liabilities
of $47,333,842. Moreover, debt maturing within six months
amounts to only $6,817,000 and no doubt will be taken care of
without trouble. However, the near-term outlook which may be
classified as fair may take a more serious aspect if the ex-
pected increase in rates is not substantial and if the bus-
iness recession is not soon over.
Longer Term Outlook
During the depression the New York Central cut main-
tenance charges drastically to bolster the earnings available
for fixed charges. From 1927 to 1929 an average of $7,200
per mile was spent for maintenance of way and in the period
1933-1936 this expenditure had decreased to ^2,700. Coupled
with decreased maintenance charges the Company s.lso made a
large reduction in depreciation charges. This, on the whole,
spells deferred needs. This condition, normally would not
be of serious consequence. However, it must be kept in mind
that the Company has more than $250,000,000 in long-term
debt maturing within the next fifteen years. In all fair-
ness it must be said that the Company has taken hold of this
maturity problem and in the past two years has effected many
i
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beneficial changes. However, the problems ahead are very
formidable.
The road derives the bulk of its revenues from move-
ments of coal, steel and other manufactured and miscellaneous
products and is thus geared in its operations to the pace of
general business activity, V/hile this factor serves sharply
to depress earnings during periods characterized by a receding
tide of industrial fortunes, the road over a long span of
years in the past has recorded average annual returns com-
fortably providing for interest requirements.
Recovery from the depression low of 1932 when fixed
charges were covered only 0.70 times has not as yet been
achieved. This does not necessarily mean that the road's
traffic and earning power have beoi permanently impaired but
it does indicate that a return to former earning power is
quite unlilcely. However, it is too early to place any pre-
diction upon the Company's ability to again produce sufficient
revenue to remove it from the border line classification.
All things considered the declining trend in passenger
traffic, and the inability of the road to recover from the
depression lows, coupled with sizeable deferred maintenance
charges and i?250,000,000 in debt to be met within the next
fifteen years, places an uncertain outlook upon the future of
the New York Central.
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Investment Status
The long-term outlook for the New York Central is un-
certain, therefore, its securities cannot be classified as
riskless investments. The inability of the road to main-
tain earnings during the depression indicates a decided
weakness. Recovery since 1932 has not been pronounced
giving evidence that the road's former position may never
be attained.
Price Range
Poor's 1937
Rat ing Hip;h Low
A^* New York Central & Hudson River 33-s 1997 105 90
A'-^ Lake Shore Collateral 3is 1998 99 80
A* Michigan Central Collateral 3^3 1998 97 78
A New York Central Conv. 3is 1952 110 80
A New York Central Cons. 4s 1998 106 77
B^^ New York Central Sec. S.F. 3fs 1946 104 86
B^^* New York Central Ref
. Imp. 4|s 2013 96 59
B** New York Central Ref. Imp. 5s 2013 103 68
C^i^ New York Central Common Stock 55 15
The New York Central & Hudson River Mortgage 33"S and
the Lake Shore and ilichigan Central Collateral 3"|s, guaranteed
by the New York Central are the highest grade bonds in the
system, barring, of course, equipment trust certificates.
However, their market position is too insecure to warrant
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their inclusion in portfolios demanding the highest invest-
ment calibre. On the whole the issues of the New York
Central are subject to fairly wide fluctuations in market
price in line with other bonds embodying a speculative
tinge. The bonds should not be considered by those requiring
safety of principal. However, at current levels considerably
below par the bonds are interesting speculations on the
ability of the New York Central to raise itself from the
border line class.
I
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NEW YORK. CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.
The i^ew York Chicago & St. Louis Railroad, better
known as "Nickel Plate", is controlled by the Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., and operates approximately 1,700 miles of track.
The road's lines extend between Buffalo and Chicago and
between Buffalo and St, Louis, with feeder lines extending
to Detroit, Indianapolis, and Peoria, Illinois. Control of
the V.Tieeling & Lake Srie affords entry into the West Virginia
coal fields. The road has the advantage of a heavy inter-
change of traffic with the Pere Marquette, ^Vheeling & Lake
Srie and other railroads in the Van Sweringen group.
Capitalization
Funded debt at roughly |l60,000,000 or 70% of total
capitalization, is fairly high on a per mile basis although
traffic density likewise is above average. Together with the
$36,054,000 §fo preferred stock, the funded debt affords the
337 » 427 common shares greater leverage than that possessed
by practically any rail stock not representing property in
receivership.
The depression hit the road at a period when it was
((
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necessary to meet substantial maturities. In 1932, |20,-
000,000 notes fell due, A 25% cash payment was made and
15% ( s^l5,000,000) was extended to October 1, 1935. At
maturity the road sought to extend these notes for three
years at the same rate of interest {6%), After some hesitation
on the part of investors, a sufficient number assented to the
plan which was declared operative toward the end of January,
1936. More than 90^ of the notes were deposited under the
plan. In the early part of 1938 an offer was mad^ to the
holders of these 6% notes to extend them to October 1, 19^7
at 3^ interest. This offer has not as yet been accepted.
(February 10, 1938)
Traffic
Nickel Plate has become heavily dependent on industrial
output largely through guidance of the Van Sv/eringen interests
in establishing the road as a leading hauler of bituminous
coal picked up from the Chesapeake & Ohio and the Hocking
Valley Railway, which tap the mining fields in West Virginia
and eastern Kentucky, The Van Sweringen interests also
combined in the system the Toledo, St, Louis & Western Rail-
road and the Lake Erie and Western Railroad, which brought
a diversification of freight traffic to include substantial
movement of com, wheat and other agricultural products.
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Important traffic in petroleum products northward and east
ward from St. Louis also was realized with the large scale
development of oil fields in the Texas area. 3y far the
greater part of the road's freight traffic comes from con-
necting lines - about 75/^ of revenue tonnage last year.
The following table shows the principal sources of
revenue.
Products Animals Products Products Mf rs.
Year of A^ri, & Proda of Mines of Forests & Misc.
1932 20,60% 21.48^ 15.06^^ 2.34^ 31.52,^
1933 17.00 21.75 18.35 2.26 34,14
193^ 15.86 20,02 19.15 2.08 36,39
1935 15.72 14,35 20,91 2.60 41.27
1936 16,72 12,70 19.40 2.97 44,40
Source : Mundy '
s
Earning Power of Railroads Page 546.
The principal products transported are bituminous coal,
petroleum products, motor vehicles and parts, steel products,
building supplies and grain. Manufactured and miscellaneous
products including less-than-car-load-merchandise in 1936
accounted for more than ^0% of total freight revenues. In
the same year the leading commodities carried together with
their contribution to freight revenues were; bituminous
coal 13.64^, iron and steel 8,93"^, grain and flour 8,36^
and fresh meats and packing house products 6.56/S. Passenger
traffic is of nominal significance.
I\
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Earnings
Taken over practically as a cast off from the New York
Central in 1916 by the late Van 3\veringen brothers, the
Nickel Plate subsequently merged with several smaller proper-
ties and has been developed into a highly efficient railroad
that commended more than its share of traffic during the
prosperous years and as the following table shows has made an
outstanding record of earnings until recent years.
Avail, for Fixed Times
Year Fixed Chp:.s. Charstes Earned
1922 $8,805,320 $3,465,356 2.54
1923 10,398,887 4,067,545 2.56
1924 10,988,721 5,119,474 2.15
1925 12,056,906 5,611,099 2.15
1926 13,669,605 5,603,297 2.44
1927 12,469,579 5,803,102 2.14
1928 12,261,038 5,882,378 2.08
1929 13,585,193 6,195,151 2.19
1930 12,270,117 7,874,373 1.56
1931 7,555,016 7,765,429 0.97
1932 3,507,694 7,918,128 0.44
1933 6,582,368 7,788,004 0.84
1934 7,522,575 7,463,941 1.01
1935 8,581,792 7,465,863 1.15
#1936 14,883,205 7,502,723 1.98
Income includes special payment of ^4,838,106 from
Wheeling and Lake Erie Ry. on account of accumulated
dividends on the 7% prior lien stock.
Source
:
Mundy ' s "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 547.
In the eight years preceding the depression earnings
were relatively stable varying between $5,870,000 in 1924
and $8,067,000 in 1926, an average of ^15,82 a share on the
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common stock. During the depression the high leverage factor
operated against the ji.inior equity v/ith telling effect. At
the depths of the depression in 1932 fixed charges were covered
0.44 times and a deficit of $19f48 was reported on the common
shares
.
Recovery from the depression lows was slow and in line
with the recovery in the heavy industries. Rising activity
in the heavy industries, particularly steel, together with
the expansion in the motor industry coupled with a special
payment of jpA, 838,106 from the '^Theeling and Lake Erie Ry,
on account of accumulations on the "jfo prior lien stock,
"brought fixed charge coverage to 1.98 in 1936. Despite higher
costs, floods and interruptions in industrial operations,
earnings continued their favorable trend until late in 1937
when the sudden drop in "business cut deeply into earnings and
fixed charges v/ere just about covered for the full year.
Substantial common dividends were paid between 1923 and
1931 and since the latter date dividends have been omitted.
Payments were made regularly on the 6% preferred until 1932
and none thereafter. As of January 1, 1938 preferred arrear-
ages approximated c|fl3, 520,000 or 137.50 a share.
Near Term Outlook
The recession in business dating from August 1937 has
y
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created great uncertainity concerning the New York Chicago
& St. Louis's ability to extend or refund its ^^IS* 000, 000
notes due October 1, 1938. Perhaps the failure of the Erie
Railroad in January of 1938 has caused these fears to be
current. The Nickel Plate, however, unlike the 2rie, is
in good financial shape, having paid off all RFC loans and
other floating debt by an issue of ^16, 000, 000 secured 4s,
in August 1936, Current assets on November 30, 1937, in-
cluding #5,077,850 in cash, amounted to $9,859,914 and were
almost twice current liabilities of ;?5,439,034. IVhile this
condition seems to be quite favorable the treasury is other-
wise bare with aLmost no balance of unpledged marketable or
other investments that could be used to collateralize a
loan from the RFC, Practically all the valuable security
holdings of the road are pledged as security under the
secured 4s of 1946,
The road's success in refunding or extending the notes
before their due date depends upon the size of the freight
rate increase and upon the sentiment of business in general.
If business shows signs of improvement in the fall of 1938
and the freight rate increases are satisfactory it is very
likely that the Nickel Plate will be able to extend or refund
the notes. If, on the other hand, business does not show
the expected improvement before this fall the assistance of
the Chesapeake & Ohio, which controls the Nickel Plate, will
1i
]
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be needed. Although the Chesapeake & Ohio did not come to
the rescue of the controlled Erie, there are raany indications
that it will help the Nickel Plate out of its difficulties,
because the latter is in far better financial shape than the
Erie and is a more promising and valuable road. Furthermore,
the Chesapeake & Ohio came to the rescue of the Nickel Plate
back in 1935 when the condition of the road and its outlook
was not nearly so satisfactory as at present. The fate of the
Erie has little necessary connection with this case.
Although the near-term outlook for the road is uncertain,
there is a good chance that the Nickel Plate will escape re-
ceivership. All things considered, it appears likely that
a substantial freight rate increase will be granted some-
time in March 1938 and that business v/ill show definite signs
of improving before the fall and that the Nickel Plate will
be able to extend or refund its maturing note issue without
any assistance from the Chesapeake & Ohio or the RFC, In
the event that conditions do not improve sufficiently to
warrant an extension or a refund the Chesapeake & Ohio will,
no doubt, come personally to the rescue of the road, or it
will guarantee a. loan from the RFC, thus helping the Nickel
Plate over this difficult period.
Longer Term Outlook
With an exceptionally heavy funded debt the New York
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Chicago & St. Louis is in a poor position to weather financial
storms. Moreover, the road is dependent to an extreme degree
upon a sustained activity in general business for its well-
being. Any substantial drop in business is rapidly reflected
in the railroad's earnings and, due to the extensive funded
debt, quickly forces the road into the red. Financial con-
dition while temporarily satisfactory, due to the J4, 032, 000
received from the V/heeling and Lake Erie in settlement of
preferred accuinulations , is not sound. The road has used up
practically all its available collateral, and while no loans
are owing to the RFC or banks, this source of revenue will,
no doubt, be unavailable in time of need unless the Nickel
Plate can induce the Chesapeake & Ohio to guarantee the loan.
The long-term outlook for the Nickel Plate cannot be
classified as favorable. The conditions which are pre-
venting the road from returning to its former earning power
are not temporary. The competition of the private car, the
motor truck and the relocation of industry have definitely
impaired the earning power of this once powerful and profit-
able road. That future earning power will be insufficient
to support the present capitalization, is very probable. The
road no doubt will continue in its present state until the
next larrte financial upset in general business, then, the road
will be forced to recapitalize and to reduce funded debt to a
supportable size in relation to the value of the road and its
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earning power.
The salvation of the New York Chicago & St. Louis may
be realized by a merger with the Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. before
serious difficulties arise. In fact, a merger with the Ches-
apeake & Ohio appears a logical eventuality, as that road
will soon acquire from affiliates 57?^ of rJickel Plate's
common. Moreover, merger v/ould be a step in the formation
of the ice's proposed consolidated rail system number six.
It is obvious that the securities of a road, as near
to a financial colapse as the New York Chicago & St. Louis, -
could not possess any investinent merit. Although the road
may not fail during the next few years it is doubtful
whether it could last through another severe depression.
The following table showing the violent fluctuations
in market price of the securities of the Nev; York Chicago
& St. Louis in 1937, is sufficient evidence of the road's
weak position.
Investment Status
Poor's
Rat ing
Price Range
1937
Hip:h Low
B'^* New York Chicago & St. Louis notes 4s 1946
B''^ New York Chicago & St. Louis Ref. 5~gs 1974
B* New York Chicago & St. Louis Ref. 4ts 1978
105
105
95
87
69
53
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Poor '
s
Ratlnp:
B New York Chicago & St.
B*^ New York Chicago & St.
C* Nev/ York Chicago & St.
C New York Chicago & St.
Price Range
1937
High Low
Louis 6% notes 1938 101 71
Louis Col. Trust 4s '46 105 87
Louis 6fo Preferred 100 30
Louis Common 72 l4
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PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.
The Pennsylvania is the largest and strongest of the
Eastern Trunk Line systems. It operates over 10,000 miles
of road in thirteen states east of the Mississippi River
and north of the Ohio, serving fourteen of the largest states
in the area. Its extensive lines form a veritable network
through the great centers of coal and iron production.
During its long existence it has undergone great physical
expansion, which naturally has been accompanied by a
corresponding increase in capitalization. The Company is
known as the world's largest transportation system; it not
only operates more mileage than any other railroad in the
country but also handles more freight and more passengers
and it has more multiple track mileage, higher standards
of road-bed and equipment.
The TT?<»n!?-gement has been extremely aggressive in adopt-
ing innovations, and in combating the competition from other
forms of transportation. The Company conipleted during 1935
the electrification of 1,405 miles of track for both pass-
enger and freight services, between New York and \Yashington.
In some sections of the territory served, store-door-pick-
up and delivery service has been instituted in order to meet
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competition from motor trucks.
The Pennsylvania has large investments in railroad
properties outside its own system giving it v;orking control
of the Lehigh Valley, Norfolk & Western, Wabash and in the
New York New Haven & Hartford.
Capitalization
As compared with other eastern roads, the Pennsylvania's
debt is conservative being only §701,279,044. Moreover, it
is supportable a-s is shown by the fact that fixed charges
were earned throughout the depression and not at the expense
of reduced maintenance. For the railroad company proper,
funded debt comprises 31% of total capitalisation which is -
beloiv the national average. If leased line debt is counted,
however, the ratio for the system rises to 59%. There is
no preferred stock outstanding and only 13,167,754 shares of
common, par value -jSO,
Traffic
Occupying as it does a dominant position in the indus-
trialized East, the Pennsylvania is dependent to a large
extent on activity in the heavy industries. An examination
of the follov/ing table reveals the type of traffic most
important to this railroad.
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Year
Products
of A^ri,
Animals
& Prods.
Products
of Mines
Products
of Forests
Mfrs.
& Misc.
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
8.81%
7.99
7.35
6.44
5.96
3.98^
4.03
3.99
3.15
2.79
28.21;^
30.09
30.09
29.34
29.84
1.86^
1.98
1.75
1.91
2.07
23.07^
25.42
25.72
28.81
30.92
Source : "Mundy '
s
Earning Power of Railroads" Page 596.
While Pennsylvania's traffic is v/ell diversified, the
balance is in favor of heavy goods as against consumer goods,
Norms.lly manufactures and miscellaneous contribute about
35^ of total revenue and products of mines a similar amount,
the most important item b3ing bituminous coal then iron and
steel products. Agricultural and anima.1 products contribute
about 12,^ in normal times. Passenger traffic is highly
important and contributes about 16^ of gross revenues.
Earnings
The Pennsylvania has paid a dividend on its common
stock in every year since its organisation in 1847 a feat
unique among rails. As can be seen by the following table
earnings have been large and fairly stable for a good many
years
.
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Avail, for Fixed Times
EarnedYear Fixed ChRS , Charp-.es
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
175,552,147
100,683,122
116,852,088
108,912,474
136,820,544
145,712,883
146,765,908
161,452,326
181,536,741
146,876,152
97,671,819
94,423,254
102,187,908
100,255,074
105,179,777
118,316,549
t51,244,478
68,301,064
65,314,011
70,777,797
74,600,220
78,144,924
78,605,612
78,944,713
80,158,224
78,066,333
78,126,625
80,849,718
82,906,739
81,439,380
81,329,979
79,574,457
1.47
1.47
1.79
1.54
1.83
1.86
1.87
2.05
2.26
1.88
1.25
1.17
1.23
1.23
1.29
1.49
Source: Mundy's "Earning Power of Railroads" Page 6OO.
Depending as it does upon heavy industry traffic it
was only natural that the Pennsylvania was hard hit by the
depression. However, fixed charges were earned 1.17 times
in 1932 the low for the depression. Recovery took place in
line with the rising activity in business and in 1936 fixed
charges were covered 1,49 times. Although earnings will not
be as large in 1937, nevertheless, fixed charges v/ill be
adequately earned.
The stability of the Company's earnings is due to a
large measure to non-operating income derived from invest-
ments in . affiliated end. other companies. ouch investments
are carried at about ^680,000,000 on the Company's balance
sheet, and produced about 30^ of gross income in 1936 and
i
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35% in 1935.
The elimination of the emergency freight surcharges
in 1936 was a blow to the Pennsylvania's revenue. However,
increased traffic more than made up for this loss and it is
expected that the promised freight rate increases will enable
the railroad to show sizeable per share earnings when bus-
iness is agr.in back to normal.
Near Term Outlook
Occupying as it does the dominant position in Eastern
Trunk Line territory, the Pennsylvania is dependent in a
very large measure upon revival of heavy 'industry, which,
although declining sharply in the latter part of 1937 and
the beginning of 1938, nevertheless, appears to be definitely
under way,
A sound current financial position has characterized
the Pennsylvania for a good many yetrs. On October 31,
1937 the Company reported current assets, including cash of
$47,752,879, equal to ifl84,090, 181 which was almost three
times current liabilities of j69 , 543,621,
The Company has only •;?6,819,000 in debt maturing within
six months which will xmquestionably be taken c-re of with-
out any difficulty. The Company came through the depression
with such strength that it w: s able to refund i?l67 , 000, 000
of bonds during 1935-1936, effecting a reduction of i?2, 500,000
/
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in annual interest charges.
Longer Term Outlook
Largely because of its rugged physical character and
its strong strategic position the Pennsylvania was able to
emerge from the depression in a very advantageous competitive
position. Indicative of the road's superior physical con-
dition is the fact that out of approximately 15,500 miles
of o\medi main tracks including about 5,200 miles of second
and additional tracks more than half is laid with 130-
pound or heavier rail, the new standard is 192-pound,
High standards coupled with superior management have
enabled the road to achieve outstanding efficiency. Main-
tenance expenditures were reduced during the depression
relative to the decline in gross. However, operating
efficiency remained high as attested by the transportation
ratio which virtually recovered 1929 levels in 1936. In this
respect, Pennsylvania's record is substantially better than
those of its major competitors.
An alert management has placed the Company in an ex-
cellent position to return to an earning power of prior-
depression levels as general business activity reaches
normal. Electrification of lines, operation of rail-air,
coordinated bus and freight-pick-up services, are all factors

142
contributing toward improvement in earnings, largely through
retention of traffic formerly diverted to other transportation
channels. Since operating efficiency and financial strength
have been unimpaired by the depression, the Company is in
a position to capitalize on increased traffic. Because of
its diversified freight and since a large portion of its
other income is derived from eastern railroads, better general
industrial conditions in the Sast v/ould benefit the Company,
i/Vhen viewed in long-range perspective, outlook for the
Pennsylvania Railroad assumes a far more promising aspect
than in the case of the average domestic steam carrier.
With its 10,000 odd miles of lines traversing the highly
industrialized central eastern region, the road ranks as the-
country's greatest in point of freight tonnage hauled and
revenues obtained. It is very difficult to conceive of any
resumption of the general business recovery movement which
would not reflect in the Company's earnings. Of aid in this
direction would be any additional freight rate increases
sanctioned by the Governmental regulating agency.
Investment Status
Although the Pennsylvania Railroad is affected adversely
by slumps in business activity, its operations are so wide-
spread and so diversified that profitable operations are
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almost assured. The road's consistent earning power is
shoivn by the fact that dividends have been paid on the
common stock in every year since 1847. This record is
unique in railroad history. The Pennsylvania is in ex-
cellent physical shape, current financial position is strong
and the management is exceptionally capable, however, the
road's margin of earnings above fixed charges is not suffi-
ciently large or stable to warrant the highest ratings for
its debentures or common stock.
The Mortgage bonds are suitable for investment accounts
requiring a high degree of safety and stability of principal.
The debentures are suitable for those who desire safety of
principal but are willing to assume the risks ent^.iled in
securities whose prices fluctuate, to some extent, with
general market conditions. The common stock, although divi-
dends are secure, is, nevertheless, semi-speculative and
only suitable for those who are able to assume the risks in-
volved in the market fluctuations of speculative issues.
A*^ Pennsylvania Railroad Cons. Mortgage 4s 1943 113 108
A^* Pennsylvania Railroad Cons. Mortgage 4s 1948 116 109
A"**-* Pennsylvania Railroad Cons. Itortgage 4|-s i960 126 115
A'^* Pennsylvania Railroad Gen. Mortgage 4ts 1981 111 95
A** Pennsylvania Railroad Gen. Mortgage 4ts 1984 112 95
A^^^ Pennsylvania Railroad Gen. -lortgage 4i-s I965 II6 101
Poor '
s
Rating
Price Range
1937
High Low
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Price Range
Poor's 1937
Ratln.g; Hl.c;h Low
A^^^- Pennsylvania Railroad Gen. Mortga/j^e 5s 1968 123 106
A* Pennsylvania Railroad Debentures 4-|-s 1970 107 87
A^^ Pennsylvania Railroad Conv. Debentures 3is'52 111 82
B* Pennsylvania Railroad Common Stock - 50 20
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CONCLUSIONS
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the adversities
of the last depression served to conceal a serious retrogression
in the railroad's competitive position. In early 1937 when
business activity was approaching former peaks it was suddenly
observed that the rails had failed to recover anything like
their former earning power, A study and careful analysis of
the situation revealed the surprising fact that the railroad
system, as a whole, was economically unsound - that earnings
were not sufficient to support the huge capitalizations with
which most roads were burdened. V/ith the advent of the auto-
mobile and truck the rails lost their monopoly of the nation's
transportc-tion business, and in a few short years fell from
an apparently secure position to an almost hand to mouth ex-
istence.
The causes of the railroad's predicament have been
carefully outlined in Part 1 of this paper. Although the
railroad system is economically unsound as presently con-
structed it is, nevertheless, essential to the v/ell-being
of this country and must be continued in some way or other.
The problem of railroad readjustment has recently
attracted considerable attention from the Federal Govern-

merit. At the present time the ICC Is holding hearings on
the advisability of granting freight rate increases to aid
the railroads over the current recession in business and to
place them on a sounder basis. Of course, it is apparent
that a freight rate increase will not correct the unsound
position of the railroads, nor will it correct the mistakes
of past managements,
A step to aid the railroads wac made in the first part
of February 1938 when a bill was introduced in Congress to
revise the bankruptcy act as affecting railroads. On last
January, nearly one-third of the nation's railroad mileage
was in the hands of trustees where most of it had been for
two to five years. Yet no major system has been reorganized.
The Bankruptcy Act was designed to expedite reorganizations,
in that it provided representation to all security groups.
In part because the procedure was Involved, but primarily
because rail earnings demonstrated no impressive recovery, it
was impossible to effect conservative capitalizations and
yet award representation to equity interests. Consequently,
the movement, led by Senator ^Yheeler, to modify bankruptcy
legislation or to return to equity receiverships, has gained
in importance. As a result future reorganizations may fall
heavily upon junior bondholders. It is very probable that
the reorganizations in the future will be far more drastic
than those in the past, but the railroads in the long-run
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will benefit^ for fixed charges will be cut to the bone
and will be in line v/ith earning power.
In any question of such economic importance as the v/ell-
being of the railroad industry, the Government is bound to
take an active interest and has submitted a number of plans
among them the ICC's Railroad Consolidation Plan which out-
lines an involved procedure to combine the railroads of the
country into twenty-one systems. These plans have each pro-
duced violent criticism.
In order to better understand the proposed plans the
most important features of each are outlined below.
Plans of the Government
Two definite schemes are now being considered by the
ICC as possible solutions of the pressing railroad problem,
both involve enlargement of the Government's power over
the carriers and v7ould be directed toward consolidation or
coordination.
One proposal v^ould involve unified operation of the
railroads by one private corporation. This corporation,
Federally-controlled at the outset, would have the power
of eminent domain to condemn properties of those carriers
which would not come voluntarily into the unified organ-
ization. The corporation would iscue its own obligations to
I
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present security holders and no cash would be paid out in
consolidation.
The general plan is to have a Federal Railroad Admin-
istrator, a non-political officer somewhat like the Federal
Coordinator, who would set the machinery of compulsory
unification in motion. A Federal corporation would be set
up and the carriers would be operated as a single system.
This plan was advanced by ICC Commissioner Carroll Miller.
A second Government plan provides for the creation of
a permanent "Transportation Board" with broad discretionary
authority and administrative powers. The new board, whose
exact function has not yet been decided upon would be similar
in a number of respects to the Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation which was created by the Emergency Transportation
Act of 1933.
Formation of the board would accompany new legislation
enlarging the Federal Government's power over the railroads,
and "putting teeth" into measures to require consolidations,
coordinations, and all types of expense saving projects.
The power to compel such programs would either be vested
in the new board, or in the ICC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function. In the latter event, the nevi board would
be the investigating and recommending agency with the ICC
acting in the manner of a court.
I
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The new board would not be affiliated with the ICC,
although the duties of the two bodies v/ould be inter-related.
Members of the board would be appointed by the President and
would be drawn from Government, labor and private quarters.
While the plan still is in the formative stage, its
proponents are said to feel that only ihrough some such plan
can the railroads be rehabilitated and saved from public
ownership. They feel that large savings can be accomplished
in railway operations through consolidations, coordinations,
reorganizations, elimination of duplicating facilities,
abandonments and various other ways.
The Plan of Railroad Managers
According to the managsrs and directors of railroads
the solution of the problems lies in v/idespread remedies,
ranging from revision of freight rate structures to reorg-
anization of the ICC,
In the opinion of rail circles the solution of the
problem lies along the following lines.
1. Because of high prices, freight structure should
be revised to equalize the factors of cost of service and
worth of service.
2. Land grant rates should be abolished.
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3. G-ovemment should reimburse roads for losses result-
ing from special drought rates,
4. Regulation by ICC of maximum and minimum intercoastal
and inland waterway rates, since the present maximum rates
only are regulated.
5. x^rorapter action by the ICC in all rate decisions.
6. All forms of transporta,tion under one regulatory body
and elimination of subsidies to barge lines.
7. Permit railroads to own and operate without restriction
in their ovm territory, buses, trucks, airplanes, steamships,
pipe-lines, etc., as transportation companies, all under
ICC jurisdiction.
8. Charge trucks and buses mileage toll for use of main
public highways,
9. Eliminate subsidies to shipping lines v/here they take
away rail traffic,
10. Agreements with labor providing for adjustments in
wages in a ratio to operating revenues.
11. Elimination of restrictive union working rules,
12. Possible appointment of a Railroad Labor Coordinator
to take care of labor difficulties,
13. Easing of Federal and state tax burdens,
14. Expense of grade crossing eliminations should be borne
by public, with rails exempt from taxation thereon.
15. Impound funds charged to yearly depreciation to pay
A
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for new equipment.
16, Revise ICC Act and TransportL-tion Act to reduce ICC
authority to about same levels it held in 1905.
17. To lower future transportation costs, establish long-
term sinking funds to extinguish present debt and use cash
or stock issues for additions and betterments. *
As can readily be seen by a study of the plans the
railroad interests propose remedies which would patch up the
existing system 7/ithout capital readjustments or 'change in
the status quo. Obviously this type of proposal would not
attack the railroad problems at their sources, it would
not eliminate the economic weaknesses v/hich are present in
the railroad system as it is now constituted.
The Government plan on the other hand is more drastic
and attacks the problem by eliminating the weaknes es which
have produced the unfavorable condition the railroads are
now in. It is quit,e clear that the plan which provides for
some type of coordination and elimination of unprofitable
and corapetiting mileage as well as cutting capitalizations
down to a point where they may be supported by earning power,
is the more feasible.
The predicament of the rails .-ill not be solved this
* The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 1938 Page 11.
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year or next; it is too serious and complex a problem to
attack without long deliberation and study. The ICC will
grant a favorable rate increase in March and will lend
money to the weaker roads until business improves. Before
a plan for the rails has been agreed upon 19-^0 v/ill be here
and the Democratic Party would not be so foolish as to attempt
to coordinate the railroads during a presidential election
year. The problem of the railroad, therefore, will not re-
ceive sufficient serious consideration until the situation
has become so acute that dr&stic reorganizations 'must be
resorted to, and if the railroads wish to escape public
o'.vnership, capitalizations must be drastically reduced in
line with earnings, thereby, eliminating the economic weak-
ness which rate increases, stream-lined trains, mergers
and the elimination of unprofitable mileage, could never
hope to accomplish.
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N-O-T-E
The material for this thesis was obtained largely from
the str.tistlcal information published by Poor's f^ublishing
Company and the publications of John Moody. The Encyclo-
paedia Britannica provided a background for the study and
Mundy's "Earning Pov/er of Railroads" was the source of
traffic and earning power tabulations. 5uch books as
Woodlock's "Anatomy of a Railroad Report" and Guthmann's
"Analysis of Financial Statements" were of considerable aid
in analyzing the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Reports, which were used freely, Snyder's "American
Railways and Investments", Van Oss's "American Railroads as
Investments", Chapman's "Railroad Mergers" and Hungerford's
"The Railroad Problem", although old books, nevertheless,
presented facts which when brought up to date, were useful.
The remaining books in the bibliography were of little value
in preparing this thesis. The periodicals and newspapers
were used as a source of current information.
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